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I. INTRODUCrION
A little over a year after the American Civil War began its end at
Appomattox Courthouse, Mary Jones, a South Georgia planter, found
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herself embroiled in a contract dispute with her former slaves, now
hands farming for a share of the crop on one of her Sea Island planta-
tions. The customary share in her area was half the crop; apparently
her contract provided her laborers with less than that amount, which
caused them to suspect duplicity on her part. After consulting with
the local Freedmen's Bureau agent, who affirmed the legality of her
contract, she demanded and received a "return to order and duty on
the place."' She wrote to her son in New York:
Since this outbreak things have moved on very well. I have told the
people that in doubting my word they offered me the greatest insult
I ever received in my life; that I had considered them friends and
treated them as such, giving them gallons of clabber every day and
syrup once a week, with rice and extra dinners; but that now they
were only laborers under contract, and only the law would rule be-
tween us.2
In Mary Jones's eyes, what had prevailed between Jones and her
workers under the regime of slavery and its immediate aftermath was
a relationship of reciprocity based on a sort of stewardship. Numer-
ous owners, overseers, and apologists for the system attempted to jus-
tify this stewardship both before and after slavery through a series of
arguments that fit together as what I will call a "moral economy of
dependency."' 3 Jones professed to throw off the regime of depen-
dency, bitterly demoting her "friends" to laborers under contract, re-
lated to her not as dependents, but only through the impersonal bonds
of law. But in fact, Jones, and many like her, continued to fight
against the replacement of dependency with the rule of law and legal
rights.4
1. Letter from Mary Jones to Charles C. Jones Jr. (May 28, 1866) in THE CHILDREN OF
PRIDE: A TRUE STORY OF GEORGIA AND THE CIVIL WAR 1340, 1340-41 (Robert M. Myers ed.,
1972) [hereinafter CHILDREN OF PRIDE].
2. Id.
3. On moral economy in general, and its use in different contexts, see E.P. Thompson, The
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 50 PAST & PRESENT 76 (1971);
ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE & EUGENE D. GENOVESE, FRUITS OF MERCHANT CAPITAL: SLAV-
ERY AND BOURGEOIS PROPERTY IN THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM 370 (1983); Eliza-
beth Fox-Genovese, The Many Faces of Moral Economy: A Contribution to a Debate, 58 PAST &
PRESENT 161 (1973). On the moral economy of slavery, see GERALD D. JAYNES, BRANCHES
WITHOUT ROOTS: GENESIS OF THE BLACK WORKING CLASS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1862-
1882 (1986). See also John S. Strickland, Traditional Culture and Moral Economy: Social and
Economic Change in the South Carolina Low Country, 1985-1910, in THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE
AGE OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION 141 (Steven Hahn & Jonathon Prude eds., 1985).
4. It is worth distinguishing between the dependency on public charity that resulted from
the failures of the marketplace or personal volition, and the dependency created by status rela-
tionships and enforced by legal restrictions on property ownership or access to economically
remunerative jobs. It is with the latter that I am concerned here. On the former manifestation
of dependency, and its connections with restructuring the postbellum Southern labor system, see
[Vol. 70:873
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Before the war, the law had supported dependency as a form of
economic organization through the law of coverture and the complex
of regulations and relationships that made up the law of slavery. Cov-
erture (the system of laws that excluded women from any and all civil
rights upon marriage), and the law of slavery were in turn justified and
supported by ideologies of gender and race explicitly linked to depen-
dency.5 Although the law of slavery was swept away on the rip-tide
of war, its underlying purpose was not: White Southerners sought
other legal means to maintain an economic organization based on de-
pendency. The law of coverture did not suffer a similar fate, but by
the latter half of the nineteenth century it was under sustained attack.6
When slavery had provided a (deceptively) coherent legal category,
racial ideology functioned to support and explain the category.7 Once
slavery as a legal category was dissolved, and coverture's vulnerabili-
ties were exposed, however, race and gender took on heightened im-
portance as the bases for a revamped system of dependency. 8
Emancipation not only freed slaves, it confronted Americans,
North and South, with the pervasiveness of dependency in the late
nineteenth century. The proslavery argument had justified slavery as
a part of a household system, on a continuum with marriage and child-
hood. Consequently, slavery's demise in some senses reinforced vari-
ous reformers' critiques of other forms of dependency. 9 For White
Amy D. Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in Postbellum America,
78 J. AM. HIST. 1265 (1992).
5. Historians are split over whether slavery represented a system of race relations or class
relations. See Barbara J. Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in REGION, RACE, AND
RECONSTRUCTION 143, 150-51 (J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982); Stepha-
nie McCurry, The Two Faces of Republicanism: Gender and Proslavery Politics in Antebellum
South Carolina, 78 J. AM. HiST. 1245, 1247 n.6 (1992); CHARLES L. FLYrNN, WHITE LAND, BLACK
LABOR: CASTE AND CLASS IN LAaE NINmTEENTH-CENTURY GEORGIA 1-5 (1983). As my argu-
ment suggests, I see the issue as an ideological one, in which ideologies of race and gender are
used to construct, support, and explain a system of dependency, which has as its major theme
neither class nor race. Because I view race as a cultural construct, and the categories "white"
and "black" to represent sociological groupings rather than biological adjectives, I have capital-
ized White and Black throughout this Article.
6. Richard Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359 (1983);
NORMA BASCH, IN THm EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 25 (1982); Reva Siegal, Home As Work. The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
7. On the deceptive coherence, or "cognitive dissonance" of slave law, see MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND
INTEREST 37-43 (1981).
8. The model for a system based solely on dependency can be found in Stephanie Mc-
Curry's elaboration of the yeoman household in antebellum South Carolina. The Politics of
Yeoman Households in South Carolina, in DIVIDED HOUSES: GENDER AND THE CIVIL WAR 22,
22-38 (Catherine Clinton & Nina Silber eds., 1992).
9. On the feminist use of slavery, see John S. Mill, On the Subjection of Women, in Tim
FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 196, 201-02, 207-10 (Alice S. Rossi ed.,
1995]
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Southerners, at least, belief in their own antebellum rhetoric led them
to rethink the compass of household dependency after a key compo-
nent - slavery - had been destroyed.
For reasons complicated and opaque, Southern Whites set up in-
terracial marriage as one of their most potent symbols of what they
perceived as the manifest danger and wrongheadedness of suggesting
that freedom should include equality. Although both political and
civil equality were deplored and resisted, Southern Whites made what
they referred to as "social equality," the point beyond which they
would not give ground. In so doing, they used the category of "social
rights" to effectively limit access to the full range of citizenship rights
and privileges. 10
Freedom for slaves was bad enough - a situation to be endured
only because superior force of arms imposed it. In fact, freedom
would be blamed for the fabricated epidemic of Black men raping
White women, the myth that became the stalking horse for the White
reign of terror that gripped the South for decades, well into the mid-
twentieth century. Interracial marriage, on the other hand, was less a
decoy in the White South's war against equality, than a mixed warning
and fear of what true equality might mean - a thought that was ap-
parently beyond rational contemplation. Interracial marriage be-
tween Black men and White women was taken as an affront to the
very definition of manhood, which had as core elements whiteness and
access to esteem. Manhood's negative referents were, among others,
White women and Black men.' 2 Interracial marriage between White
1973); Amy D. Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of
Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437 (1989). Michael Grossberg argues that dependent
rights became increasingly enforceable over the course of the nineteenth century as republican-
ism undermined the patriarchal family and judges created a "judicial patriarchy" to allocate
rights and responsibilities that had traditionally been the prerogative of the father. It may well
be this "judicial patriarchy" and the illusion it created of legally enforceable "dependents'
rights" that has helped make the journey to equal rights such a long one. MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 244-47,
300-02 (1985).
10. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the antebellum history of this phrase; it
was certainly in use in connection with racial intermarriage, although how widely is unclear. See,
e.g., Mr. Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Charleston, Illinois (Sept. 18, 1858)
in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 636, 636-37 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). What is clear is that by the time of Reconstruction, "social equality"
would become virtually synonymous with miscegenation.
11. In the North, interracial marriage did serve primarily as a decoy, used to magnify parti-
san differences between political parties. See infra text accompanying note 104.
12. On women as manhood's negative referents, see E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN
MANHOOD: TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN
ERA 217-22, 270-74 (1993); BERTRAM WYA-r-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETmics AND BE-
[Vol. 70:873
ONLY THE LAW WOULD RULE BETWEEN US
men and Black women, on the other hand, did not so much challenge
manhood's definition, as it represented a transgression against man-
hood's tenets. But, in either case, gender and race became inter-
twined in the ideology of the White South; they were mutually
defining.
This Article offers some preliminary thoughts about a much
larger undertaking: an exploration of why sex and gender have been
historically bound up with race, and how these concepts figured in the
process by which the meaning of civil, social and political rights were
parsed out during Reconstruction and beyond. One of the legal
places where gender, race, and dependency were most closely entan-
gled was in the prohibitions on interracial marriage and its branching
thickets, such as lynching. At the core of the early debate were sev-
eral closely linked questions about what kind of contract marriage
was, its social and legal meaning in the shambles of the slave system,
and, finally, what the limits of the right to marry, or to choose one's
associates, might be in a world where the meaning and content of
"rights" were up for grabs.
Another question, from the perspective of Whites, was how man-
hood would be defined and its attributes protected from dilution or
negation by access to those attributes by Black men. From the per-
spective of Blacks, the question of access to manhood was equally
pressing from the other direction. 13 Rights - civil, political and social
- were the locus of this battle, with contract, suffrage and public ac-
commodations at the center of each of these categories. Interracial
marriage, and the social equality it was made to represent, was used to
forestall access by Blacks to a whole range of public rights and privi-
leges, because such access, according to its opponents' beliefs, must
ultimately lead to interracial marriage. 14
I will first lay out the antebellum understandings of and justifica-
tions for the moral economy of dependency and their relationship to
later delineations of different categories of rights - civil, political and
social.15 Then, focussing particularly on Georgia and the federal con-
HAVIOR IN TM OLD SOUTH 34-35, 49-55 (1982). Black women seemed often to disappear from
the equation altogether, but they, as well as Black men negatively defined and complicated the
concept of gender, or what in contemporary terms would have been referred to as womanhood
and manhood.
13. The definition of manhood was of interest to women as well as men of both groups. The
definitions of "lady" and "womanhood" in the light of race were equally complex, and beyond
the scope of this Article.
14. The circularity of the argument may explain part of its power.
15. For the Reconstruction era division of rights into hierarchical strata, see HAROLD M.
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
1995]
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gress, I will explore the Reconstruction debates over rights and con-
tract in the context of interracial marriage, and the manifestation of
the conclusions reached in the symbol and tragedy of lynching. Fi-
nally, I will offer some thoughts about the connections between law,
race, and gender on the legal battlegrounds of intimacy and free will:
the law of marriage and the law of contract.
II. THE MORAL ECONOMY OF DEPENDENCY
AND THE ANTEBELLUM MEANING OF "RIGHTS"
Antebellum defenses of slavery, in conjunction with slave man-
agement literature, laid out much of what Southern Whites came to
believe was a hierarchical structure of rights that had, as its base, a
concept of dependent rights and reciprocal duties. This belief was es-
pecially true in the context of the regulation of marriage and the mar-
riage contract. In the realm of law, Southern defenders of slavery
were comfortable with a continuum between public and private life
that relegated significant responsibilities for social order to the "law of
the father."
Southern judges were faced with the apparent difficulty of ex-
plaining and justifying a paternalist social and labor system through
the use of legal language that Northern jurists had devised for sup-
porting an individualistic, free labor society. In fitting their legal doc-
trines with Northern precedents in market settings, "slave owners
found it difficult to explain paternalism in the [Northern] language of
individualism."'16 But slave owners had another language at their dis-
posal, one that was familiar to Northerners, and one that they used:
the language of domesticity and dependence. The Southern version of
the ideology of domesticity provided Southern slaveholders with a na-
tionally understood lexicon for articulating a patriarchal vision of
rights-in-servitude that they characterized and defended as "depen-
dent rights.' 7 Slaveholders' assertions that slaves possessed certain
moral claims against their masters, which slaveholders expressed as
the rights of slaves and the duties of masters, functioned ideologically
MENT 1835-1875, at 394-438 (1982); Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional
Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST.
884,884-90 (1987). See also J. R. PoLE, TmE PuRsurr OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 206-
07 (2d ed. 1993).
16. TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 36.
17. The concept of dependent rights was not unique to Southern slaveholders, but the need
to defend their way of life led them to create one of the most explicit and sustained defenses of
the concept.
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as a "moral economy" of dependency and slavery.18 Dependency was
the defining factor in a social system that was rooted in a patriarchal
ideal and which encompassed, in differing degrees, all household
relationships.
According to this model of social life, the filial household was not
only the basis of society, but the only place where weakness and de-
pendence could be granted what were commonly referred to as
"rights" and what was claimed to be actual, although not formal,
equality in the allocation of these "rights." Through the "slavery-as-a-
positive-good" argument, planters sought to justify and explain - in a
very real sense, to create and re-create - their social system.19 Part
of this endeavor was an appeal to what were initially at least two dis-
tinct categories of rights, categories that would later be broken down
even further. On the one hand they claimed constitutional, political
"rights as trumps" for themselves; on the other, they averred the exist-
ence of dependent, economic rights, or rights as the fulfillment of
needs rather than as entitlements, for their households.20 It is with the
latter that this Article is most concerned. Rights language in the
hands of White slaveholders, given the context of other language
about servitude and hierarchy, clearly had a meaning quite different
from the dominant liberal meaning, which focused on individualism,
autonomy, and the institutional vindication of those values for White
18. JAYNES, supra note 3, at 3-15. See also Strickland, supra note 3, at 141-78. Larry Tise
has identified "conservative republicanism" as another national language with which not only
Southern proslavery writers, but Northern writers as well defended the peculiar institution.
LARRY E. TISE, PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, 1701-
1840, at 347-62 (1987).
19. The other, and generally earlier, defense of slavery was premised on the notion that it
was a necessary evil. The "positive good" argument sought to place slavery, and thus slaveown-
ers, on a higher moral ground by claiming that slavery was a more humane and rational form of
social and economic organization than free labor. See, e.g., Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Modernizing
Southern Slavery: The Proslavery Argument Reinterpreted, in REGION, RACE, AND RECON-
sTRUCnON 27 (J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982).
20. See Hendrik Hartog, Constitution of Aspiration, The Rights That Belong to Us All, 74 J.
AM. HIsT. 1013, 1020-21 (1987). As Stephanie McCurry suggests, antebellum Southern ministers
and politicians "offered an elaborate theory of providential relations and particularistic rights"
under which rights were specific to status. McCurry, supra note 5, at 1250. Drew Gilpin Faust's
recovery of the "sacred circle" of the Southern intellectuals, and their defense of slavery estab-
lishes the same theme. "A natural right, according to Simms and his network, took into account
the reality of the natural laws of inequality and was 'not intended to disturb the natural degrees
of humanity ... not to make the butcher a judge, or the baker a president, but to protect them,
according to their claims as butcher and baker.' The natural society, therefore, was inevitably
hierarchical and provided for appropriate and orderly differentiations among men." DREw G.
FAUST, A SACRED CIRCLE: THE DILEMMA OF THE INTELLECTUAL IN THE OLD SOUTH, 1840-
1860, at 120 (1977). See also THOMAS R. R. COBB, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SLAVERY, FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIODS, at ccxl (Philadelphia, T. & J. Johnson & Co., 1858) ("natural rights
depend entirely upon the nature of the possessor, not of the right; for, it is the former and not
the latter that determines the question of right").
1995]
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males. But, underneath that dominant meaning another strata of
rights-talk existed that was applied to people, such as women, chil-
dren, idiots, and lunatics, who were denied access to liberal political
rights: those who in the language of the law were defined as depen-
dent. Although needs were explicitly equated with rights in reference
to dependents, when placed next to the lexicon of legal rights for
which there existed legal remedies, the language of dependent rights
more accurately reflected a concept of reciprocal duties. 21 It was this
language that slaveholders appropriated in their defense. And, it was
this set of ideas that would underpin and influence Southern Whites'
attempts to shape the post-war meaning and limits of fundamental
Constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities for former slaves, and
to cabin them off from other categories of rights.22
A. Dependent Rights and Rights in Dependency
Most nineteenth-century Americans, North and South, probably
believed that all household relationships either were or should be gov-
erned by notions of the rights and duties of dependency. But these
notions reached their fullest articulation in the antebellum South
under pressure to defend slavery as a moral organization of society.
In the slave management literature that proliferated in the middle
years of the nineteenth century, the phrase "rights of slaves" was sy-
nonymous with "duties of masters.' '23 By the 1850s, the well-devel-
oped proslavery understanding of rights paid no lip service to a
classical liberal notion of natural individual rights antecedent to
human society. Instead, slavery's defenders explicitly harkened back
to an older understanding that found the bases of social order in recip-
rocal relationships of duty and obligation reposing in the family or
household.24
21. All rights might be characterized in this fashion; the critical distinction here is enforce-
ability. On the existence of a notion of reciprocal duties inherent in modem "rights-talk," see
Thomas L. Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the Age of Interpretation, 74 J. AM.
HIST. 984 (1987).
22. The literature on rights produced during the last generation is enormous. For an over-
view of this literature, see William A. Galston, Practical Philosophy and the Bill of Rights: per-
spectives on some contemporary issues, in A CULTURE OF RIGrs: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
PnLOSOPHY, POLrnCS, AND LAW - 1791 AND 1991, at 215 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakon-
ssen eds., 1991).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 26-40.
24. Paul Conner, Patriarchy: Old World and New, 17 AM. Q. 48 (1965). "The notion of
equality of duties stands midway between a system of privilege asserted by feudal landlords and
the concept of equality of rights propounded by the capitalist middle classes in the seventeenth
century in England and the late eighteenth century in France." Juliet Mitchell, Women and
Equality, in FEMINISM AND EQUALITY 28 (Anne Phillip ed., 1987).
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The argument had a distinctly moral and explicitly Christian tone,
as it was based on scriptural interpretations of biblical patriarchy and
slavery. Without institutional state guaranteed remedies, these
"slaves' rights" were "dependent rights" in more than one sense of the
term. Their recognition or enforcement relied entirely on the predi-
lections of the slaveholder, or the intervention of some civil-rights-
bearing individual (i.e., a White male) willing to set institutional
wheels in motion on behalf of the slave. Thus, to the extent that these
"entitlements" can be understood as rights at all in a modern sense,
they must be understood, not so much as "rights of dependents," but
precisely as "dependent rights"-a meaningful phrase in the nine-
teenth century that subsequent legal and social development has
transformed into an oxymoron.25
Dependent rights were familiar to all nineteenth-century Ameri-
cans through the nineteenth-century popular ideal of domesticity.
This ideal mandated a duty of support that free men owed their de-
pendent wives and children. Thus, when Virginia's George Fitzhugh
claimed for slaves an equality, though not an identity, of rights with
their masters, he was appealing to a discourse of reciprocal duties in
families that existed underneath America's Revolutionary discourse
of Constitutional rights. According to Fitzhugh, "The dependent ex-
ercise, because of their dependence, as much control over their superi-
ors, in most things, as those superiors exercise over them. Thus, and
thus only, can conditions be equalized. This constitutes practical
equality of rights, enforced not by human, but by divine law."'26 The
model for such a system of dependent rights owed more to the patri-
archy of Filmer than to Lockean contract or Jeffersonian republican-
ism. 27 Rights were personal and, like rights for married women,
depended on the proper feelings of the "lord and master." Rights in
this sense were to be vindicated by the operation of natural law or the
25. Although I do not propose to do so here, it might prove fruitful to explore the question
of whether the distinction between "rights-of-dependents" and "dependent rights" had signifi-
cance to those pressing these arguments.
26. GEORGE FrrzHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL OR SLAVES wITHoUT MASTERS 204-05 (C. Vann
Woodoward ed., 1960). See also EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE 75-86 (1976) (revealing the themes of duty and burden)[hereinafter GENOVESE,
ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL]. For various slaveholders' equation of rights with duties, see ADVICE
AMONG MASTERS: THE IDEAL IN SLAVE MANAGEMENT N TE OLD SOUTH 43,46-47 (James 0.
Breeden ed., 1980) [hereinafter ADVICE AMONG MASTERS].
27. Locke finessed the issue by segregating the domestic sphere from the political sphere
and excluding the domestic relations from consideration in political philosophy. In reality, of
course, patriarchy as a social system did not disappear with patriarchy as a political system; as a
consequence, domesticity as a "domestic philosophy," premised on dependency, grew up along-
side liberalism as a "political philosophy" premised on individualism.
1995]
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"law of the father" within the interdependent "family," with the fa-
ther's power supported implicitly by the state through the legal sys-
tem. In Georgia, as elsewhere, this meant denying access to state
power to other members of the household. 28
In the 1850s, E.N. Elliott most thoroughly and explicitly ex-
pressed the content of dependent rights:
The master, as the head of the system, has a right to the obedience
and labor of the slave, but the slave has also his mutual rights in the
master; the right of protection, the right of counsel and guidance,
the right of subsistence, the right of care and attention in sickness
and old age. He has also a right in his master as the sole arbiter in
all his wrongs and difficulties, and as a merciful judge and dispenser
of law to award the penalty of his misdeeds. 29
In the 1830s, Harriet Martineau provided a more succinct explanation
of slaveholders' understanding of rights for slaves: "Sufficient subsis-
tence in return for labor. ' 30 This prescription has a familiar ring:
"support for labor" echoes through family law, which of course was
paired with master and servant in the law of domestic relations
throughout the nineteenth century.31
Among the most significant of the rights that slaveholders
claimed for their slaves were rights to subsistence, housing and cloth-
ing, or what would aproximate economic, as opposed to political,
rights.32 White Southerners found it morally comfortable to defend
slavery as a system of labor in part because they lived in a world that,
rhetoric of egalitarianism to the contrary, saw dependency as a neces-
sary part of a rational society. Dependency was most often contained
within a household, and was defined as a relationship to the head of
28. Examples of such denials include making the action of seduction a father's action,
rather than the daughter's, and enforcing the wife's right to support from her husband through
the doctrine of necessaries - a merchant's action unavailable to wives directly.
29. E.N. ELLOTi-F, AN INTRODUCrION TO COTrON is KING AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGU-
MENTS, reprinted in GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 26, at 76. These "rights" al-
most perfectly parallel the appurtenances of patriarchy listed by Cobb. See infra note 40 and
accompanying text.
30. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 26, at 78.
31. Id. See also SOUTHERN CULTIVATOR, Jan., 1866, at 3 (middle Georgia's agricultural
journal). The more familiar and comfortable formulation of this was "support for obedience."
Obedience was the overarching obligation within which labor was subsumed.
32. Other groups made claims for themselves based on a divergent understanding of the
need for economic rights to complement political rights, most notably temperance, evangelical
and suffrage women, and the labor movement. The contemporary failure to recognize economic
rights as legitimate, much less privileged equally with political rights, may be due in no small part
to the close connection of such arguments with slavery and dependency, not to mention social-
ism. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword
of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309 (1994). In a society born in a rhetoric of independence
and individualism, the connection of economic rights with a defense of slavery could only have
served to highlight the folly of promoting economic rights.
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the household. Dependent statuses were arranged in a hierarchy
under the rule of the husband/father/master. Wives occupied the step
under husband, with the other statuses ranging in descending order to
children, wage laborers, indentured servants and apprentices, down
finally to slaves (who Whites did not differentiate, legally or other-
wise, by family status). 33
In response to abolitionist attacks on slavery, Southern elites de-
fended their "peculiar institution" by assailing the free labor system of
the North and Europe, under which, slaveholders argued, work was
wrongly separated from worker, job from home, and organic society
was rent root from branch in a manner that would lead to the ultimate
destruction of the whole.3' The lack of control over the total lives of
workers that freedom of contract and domestic privacy required was
anathema to southern sociology both before and after the war. The
Black Codes of the immediate post-war South are eloquent testament
to the sine qua non that total labor control represented in the mind of
the White South.35
Unlike the free labor system, according to slavery's supporters,
slavery linked the economic and domestic spheres in one location-
the household. In return for the unquestioning obedience thought
necessary for social order, domestic slavery offered "cradle to grave"
security for workers in a household economy.36 To defenders of slav-
ery, a paramount aspect of the danger of free labor was its supposed
destruction of the organic bonds of dependency. As Senator James
Henry Hammond thundered to the North in his famous "mudsiil
speech" of 1858:
[I]n short, your whole hireling class of manual laborers and "opera-
tives," as you call them, are essentially slaves. The difference be-
tween us is, that our slaves are hired for life and well compensated.
There is no starvation, no begging, no want of employment among
our people, and not too much employment either. Yours are hired
by the day, not cared for, and scantily compensated . . .37
33. On lack of differentiation of black slaves and later emancipated blacks by white society,
see ANNA J. COOPER, A VoicE FROM THE SOUTH (1988)(1892).
34. McCurry, supra note 5, at 1248-50.
35. ERic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFirNISED REVOLUTON 1863-1877, at
199-201 (1988) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCION]; JAYNES, supra note 3, at 60, 303.
36. Senator James Henry Hammond, Speech in the Senate, (Mar. 4, 1858), in CONG.
GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 71 (1858) [hereinafter Hammond Speech]. For its reception
in the South, see DREw G. FAUST, JAMES HENRY HAMMOND AND THE OLD SOUTH 346-47
(1982). See also THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH, 1830-1860 (Drew G. Faust ed., 1981) [hereinafter IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY].
37. Hammond Speech, supra note 36.
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Without dependency there could be no social control and destruction
of society would result. Thus, the more aggressive apologists saw a
close link between the class strife of Europe, the "isms" of the North,
and the dissolution of domestic dependency as the organizing princi-
ple of economic life. 38
As conflict between the North and South heightened in the mid-
dle third of the nineteenth century, many White slaveowners came to
believe what proslavery apologists such as Georgia's Thomas R.R.
Cobb or propagandists such as Virginia's George Fitzhugh, lauded as
the virtues of Southern slavery over the evils of free labor. Of particu-
lar significance for the purposes of this study is the explicit invocation
of the language of family, household, domesticity and dependency to
explain the virtues of slavery.39 To Cobb, writing in 1858, the relation-
ship between master and slave was more than simply analogous to a
familial relationship; it was a quintessentially patriarchal relationship
with all that implied in the way of a commonwealth ruled by the law
of the father:
In short, the Southern slavery is a patriarchal, social system. The
master is the head of his family. Next to wife and children, he cares
for his slaves. He avenges their injuries, protects their persons, pro-
vides for their wants, and guides their labors. In return, he is re-
vered and held as protector and master. Nine-tenths of the
Southern masters would be defended by their slaves, at the peril of
their own lives.4°
In even more explicit terms, Virginia's Robert Dabney defended
slavery in language that would have taken little imagination to trans-
pose with many Northern marriage tracts of the day, stating that
"[n]ow it is the genius of slavery to make the family the slave's com-
monwealth. The master is his magistrate and legislator .... He is a
member of a municipal society only through his master, who repre-
sents him."'41
38. See, e.g., DREw G. FAUST, The Proslavery Argument in History, in SOUTHERN STORIES:
SLAVEHOLDERS IN PEACE AND WAR 72, 85-87 (1992) [hereinafter FAUST, SOUTHERN STORIES].
39. As Eugene Genovese has persuasively argued,
Slaveholders generally believed that their slaves lived better than the great mass of
peasants and industrial workers of the world. Virtually every southerner who raised his
sic] voice at all on this subject insisted on the point, not only those who wrote articles
and made speeches for propaganda but those who commented privately in family let-
ters and wills.
GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 26, at 58. See also IDEOLOGY OF
SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 10-13.
40. COBB, supra note 20, at ccxviii; GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 26, at 73-
75 (discussing the prevalence of the familial ideology of slavery).
41. Robert L. Dabney, Defence of Virginia [and through Her, of the South] in Recent and
Pending Contests Against the Sectional Party (1867), reprinted in ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE,
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Many conservative Southern slaveholders shared Fitzhugh's
views on the virtues for social governance of families organized
around patriarchal authority and a household economy.42 Judges,
among others, were not immune to the appeal of defending slavery by
invoking the precariousness and misery of free labor; appellate opin-
ions reflect the slaveholders' widespread claims that a society of patri-
archal households was more humane than a society of possessive
individuals.43 The slaveholding South was also situated within an
ethos of evangelical Protestantism. Where Fitzhugh and other pro-
slavery intellectuals failed to penetrate, evangelical religion filled in:
"The ordinary slaveholder, seldom a reading man, appreciated the do-
mestic imagery and paternal authoritarianism that he heard from the
pulpit."44 As a descendant of the Lumpkins, a huge clan of slavehold-
ing Georgians, noted:
[R]eligion was in no way incidental to these middle Georgia ante-
bellum planters. As they were solid, ambitious men, conscious of
responsibilities of rulership, so were they pious and God-fearing, at
least the better of them, with an acutely developed sense of duty....
It was a simple faith with little adornment: these men believed in
church, in going to church, in training their charges, be they children
or slaves, in religious duties.45
And increasingly, as more and more slaveholders sought to en-
hance the efficiency of their workforce and justify their social system
on moral, ethical and religious grounds-that is, create a model of the
Christian master imbued in a moral economy of slavery-they began
advising each other on slave management in terms that grounded the
"positive good" of slavery in the patriarchal family.46 A planter
WITHIN TiH PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WInTE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 37
(1988) [hereinafter FoX-GENOVESE, PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD].
42. Charles Colcock Jones, Jr., for instance, on receiving word from his mother of the
deaths of two of her slaves, commented in a letter meant only for family consumption, that at
least the orphans left behind would be cared for in the family, unlike what he expected would
happen in the free North, which was that they would be "left to public charity." Letter from
Charles Colcock Jones, Jr. to Mary Jones (Nov. 22, 1856), in CHILDREN OF PRIDE, supra note 1,
at 266. See also Dudley v. Mallery, 4 Ga. 52 (1848); C. Vann Woodward, Foreward to FrrzHUGH,
supra note 26, at vii. For the importance of the familial metaphor to Southern slaveholding
women, see Fox-GENOVESE, PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD, supra note 41, at 100-02, 131-34.
43. See, e.g., Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185 (1853).
44. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 19, at 32. Fitzhugh's claims for slavery in the abstract, as op-
posed to others' defense of the concrete instance of racial slavery in the South, went too far for
most Southern slaveholders who drew the line at advocating slavery for all workers regardless of
race. Racism provided adequate logic for their system, and the contrast of slavery with free
labor served more as an invitation to abolitionists to tend their own gardens than as a suggestion
that slavery transcend racial barriers.
45. KATHARINE Du PRE LUMPKIN, Tam MAING OF A SOUTHERNER 11-12 (1946).
46. James Breeden's collection of slave management documents is immensely useful in
tracking the tacks taken by slaveholders in their public communications with each other on the
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named Foby, writing in middle Georgia's agricultural journal, The
Southern Cultivator, offered his views on "the Management of Ser-
vants" to his fellow slave owners in 1853.47 His brief for a familial,
patriarchal model for slave society explicitly rejects despotism or tyr-
anny as appropriate alternative approaches to master/slave relations.
According to Foby:
The fundamental principles upon which the system is based are sim-
ply these: that all living on the plantation, whether colored or not,
are members of the same family and to be treated as such-that
they all have their respective duties to perform, and that the happi-
ness and prosperity of all will be in proportion to the fidelity with
which each member discharges his part.48
Foby, like Fitzhugh, identified the family as the repository of
rights, and he impressed upon his slaves that membership in the fam-
ily, under the patriarch, was the means through which their rights
("needs") would be satisfied: "I take occasion to inculcate repeatedly
that, as the patriarch (not tyrant) of the family, my laws, when clearly
promulgated, must be obeyed-that, as patriarch, it is my duty to pro-
tect their rights, to feed, clothe and house them properly ... to pro-
vide for all their proper wants .... ,,49
J.B.D. De Bow also spoke of rights in connection with slavery, in
a context indicating that he, too, invested the word with a different
meaning for dependents than he would claim for himself. He wel-
comed discussion in the pages of his influential agricultural journal of
"the question of improving the moral or physical condition of the
slave, or his better regulation by law and policy, adapted to his condi-
tion, his wants, necessities and rights, or his improved status as an
agent in the production of wealth. ' 50 This comment followed De-
Bow's rejection of any further discussion of the relative merits of slav-
ery itself as a social system. By recognizing the slaves' rights and
improved status, DeBow was not challenging the existing patriarchal
topic of slavery. ADVICE AMONG MASTERS, supra note 26, at 36-42. Several slaveholders dis-
cussed patriarchal justice, referring to the plantation rules as "laws" and the master as legislator
and judge. For example, "the laws necessary for the regular and proper management of a plan-
tation should be few and simple, operating alike upon overseer and negro, and as immutable and
inviolable as those of the Medes and Persians." Id. at 37. The rules also entail the "laws of God
and man," the "lawgiver and judge," and the "lawgiver and friend." Id. at 36-41. Proper man-
agement includes "never issu[ing] an order that you do not intend to enforce, and which it is right
that you should have enforced." Id. at 42.
47. Foby, Management of Servants, SOUTHERN CULTIVATOR, Aug. 1853, at 226-27, reprinted
in ADVICE AMONG MASTERS, supra note 26, at 306-11.
48. ADVICE AMONG MASTERS, supra note 26, at 306.
49. Id.
50. 3 J.B.D. DEBOw, THE COMMERCIAL REVIEW 421 (1847).
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model or implying that slaves possessed civil rights akin to those of
free White men. Instead, he grouped rights with wants and necessities
as duties to be fulfilled by masters rather than demands to be ad-
vanced by slaves.
B. The Household Model
By law, if not practice, even free Blacks in Georgia were not to
escape the household model of dependence and control with its patri-
archal allocation of rights. In 1810, notes Ira Berlin, "Georgia took
the unprecedented step of inviting free Negroes to take white guardi-
ans to supervise their affairs."''s By 1833 the state legislature ce-
mented racially based dependence by curtailing property rights with
its decree that contracts of free Blacks, even for necessaries, would
henceforth be void unless made pursuant to an order from a court-
appointed guardian.5 2 This change followed an 1818 act, founded, ac-
cording to Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin, "on our own peculiar policy,
in order to fix the condition of a free negro in this State. '53 By this
act, free Blacks were prohibited from trading in or acquiring title to
slaves in any way except through descent.5 4
In the 1853 case of Bryan v. Walton, Lumpkin analyzed the legal
abilities of free Blacks, particularly their ability to own and convey
slaves.55 He was unable to resist the urge to step outside the case and
instruct his state on the dependent nature of free Blacks, invoking a
patriarchy more biblical than benevolent.5 6 In Bryan, the lower court
had noted in its jury charge that "the relation of free negro and guard-
ian, was of a more dependent nature, than that of ordinary Trustees
and cestui que trust."57 Lumpkin, with more than a little vitriolic ap-
proval, described this level of dependence as a state of perpetual
childhood for the free Black.58 According to Lumpkin, one might
wrongly attempt to draw an analogy from the contract of the free
Black in Bryan v. Walton to the contracts of (White) infants,
51. On the legal status of free blacks, see IRA BERLIN, SLAvEs WITHOUT MASTERS: THE
FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 95, 101 (1976); THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK
CODES OF THE SOUTH 13-41 (1965).
52. Bryan, 14 Ga. at 190.
53. Id. at 204. Inheritance through intestate succession rather than through a will.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 196-97.
56. Id. at 198 ("I feel a strong inclination, I confess, to give my sentiments pretty fully upon
this subject - to go beyond the usual limits of an opinion; and to speak in the style of argument
rather than of authority.").
57. "Beneficiary of a trust;" Id. at 190.
58. Id. at 198.
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which [it] is insisted that the infant may confirm and give binding
force to, after he comes of age. The parallel fails in this. At twenty-
one, the legal disability attached to infancy, terminates. The minor
is then a man.-But the pupilage in the other case is perpetual. The
acts of an infant are voidable, only, because at maturity, he may
affirm or disaffirm them. The acts of a free person of color are void
because he never ceases to be a ward, though he attain to the age of
Methuselah. His legal existence is forever merged in that of his
guardian. 59
At another point, Lumpkin, quoting Aristotle, equated the rela-
tion of master and slave to that of husband and wife, calling them
indispensable relations for a well-ordered state. 6° This discussion by
Lumpkin indicates that familial language frequently did not connote
affectual relations, but relations of duty and obedience.61
Of course, the ideal of dependency in a household economy
played itself out in other domestic relations as well, most explicitly in
the statuses of wife and child. These statuses, legally defined by sex
and marriage on the one hand, and age on the other, were equally
dependent in all parts of the country. Interestingly enough, however,
in the Northeast, antebellum debates over married women's property
rights and abolitionism encouraged women to challenge the tenets of
dependency; no response of similar strength occurred in the South un-
til the 1890s. Ironically, in the South both the passage of married wo-
men's property acts and abolitionism served the function of
reinforcing the ideology of dependence. 62
By the 1850s, many large slaveholders shared a sense that the
best model for a slave society was the family or household. The tone
of their argument was distinctly defensive, reflecting in the need to
assert the benevolence of the family model as a contrast to the Revo-
lutionary ideals of liberty and equality. 63 Through slave management
59. Id. at 205.
60. Id. at 200.
61. James Oakes suggests that the paternal image was as much a matter of demographics as
ideology; most of the antebellum slaveholders that he studied were over 43 years old, while short
life expectancy meant that most slaves died by age forty. The most common master/slave rela-
tionship therefore was between a middle-aged (elderly?) master and a slave under age 18.
JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS 195-96, 249-50
(1983).
62. See generally MARJORIE S. WHEELER, NEW WOMEN OF THE NEW SOUTH: THE LEAD-
ERS OF THE WOMAN'S MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN STATES (1993).
63. On the break from Revolutionary ideology, see FAUST, SOUTHERN STORIES, supra note
38, at 78-79. Nellie Kinzie Gordon (a Northerner who "married South") could not resist includ-
ing a dig in her diary description of a slaveholding friend: "He loves them [his slaves] all, I
believe, as well as he does his own relations-what do you think of that, old Beecher!" This, she
suggested, was more than Northerners-even the most ardent abolitionists--could be expected
to do. Elite white southerners by the 1850s equated "Northerner" and "abolitionist" and re-
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literature, tracts instructing masters in their religious responsibilities
toward their slaves, defenses of slavery as a basis for social organiza-
tion, and the aspirations of the law, Southern White men promulgated
dependency, above liberty and equality, as the organizing principle of
Southern society, embedded in households and controlling not only
slaves, but White women and free Blacks. Much of the content of the
positive-good argument was directed toward linking family and moral,
patriarchal "law" in defense of hierarchy and dependence. 64
The patriarchal ideal of the old South existed as a subculture
within a contractarian democracy. Consequently, slaveholders were
constrained by such widely-held national beliefs as individualism and
political equality as they sought to justify their possession of power
and dominion. They resolved the conflict by classifying their male
slaves, along with all women and children, as household dependents,
organizing the labor force on the principles of family and domesticity.
By advocating an organic social structure organized around house-
holds headed by White males and characterized by dependence and
obedience, slaveholders simply took the tenets of domesticity to gov-
ern the entire social system. They contrasted this system with free
wage labor, and found free labor wanting.65
By the last decade before the Civil War, articulate slaveholders
had begun to fashion both a defense of slavery and a sense of the need
for a cohesive and consistent approach to slave management that cir-
culated widely among themselves. A social ideal of dependence
within a household structure served as both a counter to abolitionists
in a language familiar to Northerners and as the basis for a developing
consensus on proper slave management. "Household" and "family"
sponded to abolitionist writings as if they represented a majority if not a monolithic Northern
ideology. Northern Rebel: The Journal of Nellie Kinzie Gordon, Savannah, 1862, 70 GA. HIST.
Q 477 (1986). Eliza Robarts commiserated with Mary Jones in similar fashion: "I am sorry to
hear of the death of your servant Eve. We feel those losses more than the Northerners think; the
tie is next to our relatives." Letter from Eliza Robarts to Mary Jones (Nov. 10, 1856), in C-uL-
DREN OF PRIDE, supra note 1, at 263. See also Masters Without Slaves, in WILLIE L. ROSE,
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 76-77 (William W. Freehling ed., 1982).
64. Much of what the slaveholders spoke of as law, Mark Tushnet has referred to as senti-
ment; that is, the system of patriarchal rule operated alongside of, but autonomously from, the
state legal system, and was ideally self-contained within each household. TUSHNET, supra note 7,
at 31. The point here, though, is that the slaveholders themselves spoke of their rule as law, and
seemed to believe in its legitimacy as such. Id. at 44-45.
65. On the interrelatedness of the competing ideologies of slavery and free labor, see
ERIc FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 9, 66-72 (1970) [hereinafter FONER, FREE SOIL]. See also Jonathan A.
Glickstein, Poverty Is Not Slavery: American Abolitionists and the Competitive Labor Market, in
ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 195-218 (Lewis
Perry & Michael Fellman eds., 1979).
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on the lips (or, more accurately, pens) of Southern slaveowners have
an unfamiliar ring in contemporary ears. But White Southerners as
generally, and as genuinely, believed in the essential dependent nature
of all Blacks as White males believed in the essential dependent na-
ture of White women and children. Given this belief, the family
seemed the best model for master/slave relations in a nation not dis-
posed towards recognizing slavery as the best paradigm for labor rela-
tions. After the war, this belief did not disappear. But when
emancipation removed the labor force from the White household and
destroyed the legal relationship between labor and dependency,
White male Southerners confronted challenges to pre-war under-
standings of dependence and family when the patriarchal household
was no longer a viable institution for the close control of Blacks and
the maintenance of White supremacy.
III. THE MORAL ECONOMY OF DEPENDENCY REVISED:
RIGHTS AND RECONSTRUCTION
Eric Foner has identified one of the central themes of the Recon-
struction Era as "the persistent conflict between planters' desire to
reexert control over their labor force and blacks' quest for economic
independence. '"66 Gerald Jaynes, in a penetrating study of the genesis
of the Southern Black working class, offered this distillation of the
central issue of Reconstruction: "[A]fter the abolition of slavery, how
was an industrial order dedicated to commercial production of agricul-
tural products for a market system to be maintained?" 67 Many South-
ern state legislatures addressed these issues through passage of "Black
Codes" that would, through vagrancy laws, hunting and fishing bans,
prohibitions against gun and dog ownership, and other restrictions,
effectively reassert the moral economy of dependency without the
ownership component of slavery and resolve the planter/labor conflict
in favor of the planter.68
In a lengthy disquisition on the subject, Fitzhugh represented
what many other planter class Southerners would endorse, that in or-
der to ensure an adequate supply of labor to the planting class, former
slaves would have to be compelled by some legal substitute for slav-
ery. According to Professor Jaynes:
66. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 35, at xxv-xxvi.
67. JAYNES, supra note 3, at 5.
68. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 35, at 128-36; JAYNES, supra note 3, at 301-06.
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To Fitzhugh, the threat of a truly free labor system posed a dilemma
which appeared to have no solution. If the blacks were as inher-
ently inferior and degenerate as he claimed, so that without the
close guardianship of whites they were destined to "perish and dis-
appear from the face of the earth," then the South would be left
with no labor at all. Alternatively, if the inferiority of blacks did
prove to be a consequence of slavery, the implications, pointing to a
mongrelized society, were too awful to contemplate. The one ac-
ceptable solution to this dilemma was its dissolution. The free labor
experiment could not be attempted. The only conclusion Fitzhugh
and any similar thinker could make was simple: "A great deal of
severe legislation will be required to compel Negroes to labor as
much as they should... we must have a Black Code."' 69
Black Codes for labor control were a portion of the solution to
the Southern planters' dilemma; bans on interracial marriage ad-
dressed the alternative. A "mongrelized society" was "too awful to
contemplate" because Whites feared the blurring of racial lines that
mulattoes represented.70 But at least as important for the first wave
of miscegenation bans was the fear that interracial marriage would
undermine the assumed superiority of White over Black. What White
Southerners seemed to fear more than mixed-race children was the
implication of "social equality" that mixed race marriage implied.
The intellectual and moral defense of slavery in the decades
before the Civil War led Georgia Whites vehemently to deny that civil
rights (narrowly defined) accorded to African Americans after the
war meant any change in social rights as they had been loosely defined
before the war, and more specifically defined in the debates that raged
during Reconstruction. In defense of this stance, White men not only
appealed to racism, but sought to reinforce the legal foundation for
dependency that extended to White women and children as well as to
all Blacks. While the destruction of slavery and the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment would eventually undermine many of the
ideological bases for a social theory of dependency in opposition to a
political theory of equality, such change was fought vigorously and
successfully in nineteenth-century Georgia courts, constitutional con-
ventions, and legislatures. Furthermore, it was fiercely debated in the
Federal Congress from the end of the war through the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875. One point where the issue was joined most
fervently was at the volatile intersection of sexuality, dependence and
contract: interracial marriage.
69. JAYNES, supra note 3, at 58-59 (quoting George Fitzhugh, What's To Be Done with the
Negroes?, DEBow's REV., June 1866, at 577-81).
70. Id.
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A. A Hierarchy of Rights
Because the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation freed
the slaves, but did not abolish slavery or deal with Justice Taney's dic-
tum that "the negro has no rights that the white man is bound to re-
spect," Congressional Republicans set out to craft a new legal order to
address these issues.71 One of the first orders of business was the pas-
sage, over Andrew Johnson's veto, of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,72
which declared that all persons born in the United States were citizens
of the United States,73 and, as such, had
the same right in every State and Territory of the United States to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties,
and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom
to the contrary notwithstanding. 74
President Johnson, in his veto message, had raised the possibility that
it was but a short step from Congressional provision of the citizenship
rights accorded by this bill to Congressional repeal of state statutes
forbidding marriage between races.75 The evil of the Civil Rights Act
was multi-faceted from Johnson's perspective, and included at the
most basic level the interposition of law into the relations between
former masters and former slaves.76
The Kentucky Supreme Court also challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth Amendment, declar-
ing that the Amendment "certainly gave the colored race nothing
more than freedom. It neither gave nor aimed to give them, in defi-
ance of state laws, all the rights of the white race. ' 77 To allow Con-
gress the authority, under the Thirteenth Amendment, to pass the
Civil Rights Act, would be "a monstrous construction" that would the-
oretically allow Congress to "legalize intermarriages between the two
races deteriorating to the Caucasian blood, and destructive of the so-
71. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
72. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982
(1976)).
73. With the exception of "Indians not taxed" and those subject to a foreign power.
74. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
75. Andrew Johnson's Veto of "[ain act to protect all persons in the United States in their
civil rights and furnish the means of their vindication." 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3603, 3605, 3610-11 (March 27, 1866).
76. Id.
77. Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5, 8 (1867).
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cial and legislative decorum of the states. ' 78 The evils most to be
feared from Federal usurpation of states' rights were laid out in the
concerns of Andrew Johnson and the Kentucky Supreme Court. First,
there was the fear that the labor control provided by the moral econ-
omy of dependency would be upset by the replacement of dependent
relations with legal relations; the second concern was that dependent
relations would be similarly destroyed by the imposition of "social
equality" represented in its starkest form by the legalization of mar-
riages between the races.
In the White South, the set of beliefs that had coalesced in the
moral economy of dependency clearly did not disappear with slavery;
Mary Jones and many like her bitterly "demoted" erstwhile slaves to
"only laborers under contract" while striving mightily to maintain a
hierarchy of rights that would ensure continued and reinforced depen-
dency. The "ingratitude" of former slaves was remarked incessantly
in the post-war South, and has been understood by historians as a sort
of emotional hiccup by deluded former masters.79 But complaints
about ingratitude reflected more than simple emotional disappoint-
ment; the system of dependent rights required those subjected to it to
understand rights as linked to the planter's virtue and inherent power
rather than to law.
The "inevitable dependency"80 of those physically incapable of
supporting themselves-the very old, the very young, and the incapac-
itated-revealed the White South's hostility toward replacement of
patriarchal relations with legal relations. The Assistant Commissioner
of the Freedmen's Bureau for Georgia, General Davis Tillson, issued
an order requiring former masters to support "helpless and decrepid
freed people or young children."'81 Invoking the requirements of
honor and humanity, Tillson justified this order in contractual terms,
reminding former masters of the "implied contract between the
master and his slave, that in return for his service, the slave should be
fed, clothed and lodged, during his old age." 82 Tillson added that the
elderly had fulfilled the conditions of their contract, and "the former
master is not absolved from his obligations, by the freedom of the
78. Id. at 9.
79. See generally RosE, supra note 63, at 73-89 (discussing the problem and meaning of
freed people's "ingratitude").
80. On "inevitable dependency," see generally MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
81. General Tilson's [sic] Circular, No. 5, THE SOUTHERN CULTIVATOR, Jan. 1866, at 3.
82. Id.
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slave, for which the latter is in no way responsible. '8 3 Tillson articu-
lated the nature of the relationship in much the same way that slave-
owners had done. Indeed, the only difference was that he linked the
obligations to the legal relations of contract, which were vehemently
rejected. "After all our sacrifices and losses," fumed The Southern
Cultivator, "we don't feel bound to respond when ordered to do any-
thing further for the negro." 84 According to the Cultivator, to the ex-
tent there had been a contract, the consideration had "totally failed"
because the master's duty of support was conditioned not only on the
provision of labor from the able bodied, but also on the power to en-
force obedience from all. The best hope of the freed people lay not
with the law and legally enforceable rights, but with the White South's
"natural sympathy and good feeling for those of the colored race we
are interested in."'85 Within a very short period, the debate over the
nature of post-war relationships became a sustained justification for
reasserting the social relations of slavery.
The myth of the Lost Cause, and of pure White womanhood were
turned into talismans against equality, which was accomplished in part
by dividing rights into three categories-social, political, and civil-
and according them different levels of respect and entitlement.86 In-
tertwined in the debates over rights, although not explicitly identified
as such, was the holdover notion of "dependent rights": the moral
economy of dependency. Senator Stevenson of Kentucky was most
explicit, stating that the White people of Kentucky would extend to
the colored people who were once their slaves ... kindness and
protection and they would see them kindly cared for and justly pro-
tected in the enjoyment of their civil rights; but they regard themjustly as their inferiors, and could never degrade themselves by a
social or political equality for which they never were and never can
be fitted.8
Like the pre-war slave-owning paternalists, Stevenson claimed
that "everything in the main is done for the freedman that an enlight-
ened benevolence would dictate or an enlarged humanity demand."
But, it was too much to ask, and counterproductive as well, that White
men ever agree to "confound political with civil rights" or give up
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. FONER, RECONSTRUCrION, supra note 35, at 243-45; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15,
at 395-400; WHEELER, supra note 62, at 5-8; Tushnet, supra note 15, at 886-90. On the relation-
ship between the Lost Cause of the Confederacy and White supremacy, see, e.g., LuMPKiN, supra
note 45, at 111-14, 127-47.
87. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 912 (1872).
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their "utter abhorrence of social equality between the white and black
races."88 In the same vein, Representative Alexander Stephens of
Georgia, former vice president of the Confederacy, declared of Black
men in Georgia:
They have no desire for anything partaking of the character of so-
cial rights; .. .Reciprocal duties will soon, of themselves, bring
about as much harmony and concord as are usually found in any
state or country .... [T]here is not a colored man in Georgia who
knows me who would not come to me for a personal favor.., or in
case of real grievance for a redress of personal wrongs, with more
confidence in my having justice secured him, than to any "carpet-
bagger" . . . vociferous in advocating the doctrines of the "civil-
rights bill," so called. 89
Such appeals to the pre-war tenets of the moral economy of de-
pendency were echoed throughout the White South, with concomitant
manifestations of disbelief that "dependent rights" might not seem ad-
equate and even generous to those subjected to their vagaries. Thus
Mary Jones's expression of surprise that gallons of clabber and extra
dinners should not be sufficient for "the people" when balanced
against an appeal to law;9° and thus Southern members of Congress's
assertions that Southern Whites' protective feelings towards Blacks
would assure their happiness better than the accord of legal rights
could.
B. Unlinking Dependency From Households:
Antimiscegenation, Rights and Contract
For nearly the whole of the 250 year history of slavery in
America, one constant in the regulation of the institution was the pro-
hibition on sexual relations between Whites and Blacks. Begun as a
religious ban on relations between Christians and pagans, it soon be-
came racialized, grounded in ideas about color. Ira Berlin has pointed
out the haphazard regulation of free Blacks during the colonial pe-
riod, noting the inconsistencies, ambiguities, and incomplete nature of
White thought as represented in the Black Codes.91 But, he further
notes that "[o]nly on the sensitive question of interracial sexual rela-
tions did whites throughout the South reach a firm consensus: no
88. Id
89. 43 CONG. REC. 381 (1874). In 1872, Congress passed a general amnesty bill restoring to
former Confederates the ability to hold national office, which had been prohibited under the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONsT. art. XIV, § 3. Georgia elected Stephens to the House of
Representatives shortly thereafter.
90. See CHILDREN OF PRIDE, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
91. See BERLIN, supra note 51.
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black, free or slave, could legally sleep with a white." 92 Why should
this have been?
Antimiscegenation rules, long a small part of the larger machin-
ery of Southern slave and caste law (applying as they did to free peo-
ple as well as slaves), were revived after the war, given new,
independent emphasis, and put in service as a symbol of White resist-
ance to "social equality" with former slaves. Miscegenation 93 restric-
tions, while on one level directed, as they always had been, towards
control of sexuality and maintenance of racial boundaries, were on
another level used to redefine White households as racially impregna-
ble institutions, most particularly in terms of regulations of marriage. 94
White Georgians who had been imbued with the racial/patriar-
chal rationale for slavery in the years of sectional animosity leading up
to the Civil War found adjusting to the new world of wage labor and
free contract as severe a shock as the pre-war polemics against free
society might have foretold. One woman, writing of her family's gen-
erations-old heritage of slaveholding and of her father's boyhood
training for the cloak of mastery, suggested that perhaps those who
never had actually become masters clung tighter to ideals of patri-
archy than even their fathers: "it would seem it [mastery] left a spe-
cial stamp on men who lived this life. But more particularly in a
special way it stamped their sons, who were reared to expect it and
then saw it snatched away."95
In emancipating the slaves, the North had raised the specter of
social equality through Black claims of place within the very families
to which Whites had long asserted to Northerners, and to each other,
that they rightfully belonged. 96 Once the relationship between Whites
92. Id. at 8.
93. The term "miscegenation" (from Latin "miscere," to blend, and "genus" race) was
coined by David Croly, editor of the New York World in his 1864 pamphlet entitled Miscegena-
tion: The Theory of the Blending of the Races, Applied to the American White Man and the
Negro. For the etymology of miscegenation, see the entry in OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY(1989), and infra text at notes 104-07. See also Sidney Kaplan, The Miscegenation Issue in the
Election of 1864, 34 J. NEGRO HIsT. 274 (1949); FOREST G. WOOD, BLACK SCARE THE RACIST
RESPONSE To EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 53 (1968); Eva Saks, Representing Misce-
genation Law, RARITAN, 39, 42 (Fall 1988).
94. JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MuLATrOES IN THE UNITED
STATES 75, 91-94 (1980); Martha E. Hodes, Sex Across the Color Line: White
Women and Black Men in the Nineteeth-Century American South (1991) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University).
95. LUMPKIN, supra note 45, at 41-44; for discussion on ingratitude, see id. at 73-74.
96. White Southerners did not comer the market on "social equality" fears. See DAVrD H.
FOWLER, NORTHERN ATITUDES TOWARDS INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE: LEGISLATION AND PUB-
[IC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC AND THE STATES OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1780-1930,
at 147-221 (1987) (Northern debates over bans on racial intermarriage during the height of the
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and Blacks was no longer based on a legal structure of inferiority and
servitude, however, and White power could no longer be taken for
granted, the cozy familial justification for slavery in an ostensibly free
nation became dangerous for those suddenly facing the possibility that
both Whites and Blacks might believe that familialism could be exer-
cised on an egalitarian rather than a dependent basis. No longer could
White planters rely on the law and system of slavery to maintain social
relations of dominance and distance within the spatial and emotional
confines of a household.
The "deep conviction of superiority" that planters held regarding
slaves had maintained a hierarchial social structure in the face of
levels of intimacy that went far beyond mere proximity.97 But in the
absence of its legal support, this sense of superiority alone was clearly
not sufficient for planters facing a free labor force of independently-
minded people; particularly since these people, to the surprise of
many planters, did not seem disposed to acquiesce to planter superior-
ity.98 Proximity, and even intimacy had not been problematic (other
than in a moral sense) when the law of slavery made "social equality"
a concept not easily contemplated. Several Southern states had no
antimiscegenation statutes on the books prior to the Civil War.99 But
without racial slavery to define boundaries, White Southerners
seemed truly panicked by the possibility that "white supremacy" was a
figment of the slaveholding imagination, insupportable without new
caste barriers enthroned in law. Congressional debates from 1866
through 1875 are replete with references to fears of legalized racial
intermarriage as the ultimate symbol of "social equality."' 00 Repre-
sentative Joseph Rainey of South Carolina recognized the link be-
tween "dependent rights" and White Southerners' fear of social rights,
noting:
So long as he makes himself content with ordinary gifts, why it is all
well; but when he aspires to be a man .... then he is asking too
much ... [when the] Southern states ... mete out to us what they
think we ought to have, and we receive it without objection, we are
good, clever fellows; but just as soon as we begin to assert our man-
slavery controversy). It seems, however, that white Southerners took their fears far more seri-
ously. Id. at 216-17.
97. Fields, supra note 5, at 143, 156.
98. On planters' surprise, see CHULDREN OF PRIDE, supra note 1, at 1286-87 (Letter from
Mary Jones to Eva Jones dated August 5, 1865); LUMPKiN, supra note 45, at 73-74.
99. Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina. FOWLER, supra note 96, at 217,
appendix.
100. See infra Section IV.
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hood and demand our rights, we become objectionable, we become
obnoxious, and we hear this howl about social equality.1 1
The problem lay in the aspirations of Black males to be "men."
Political rights would lead to social rights; both in differing degrees
connoted manhood, a position of power, honor, and esteem that had
hitherto been confined to White males.1' 2 "Here is the difficulty," ex-
plained Senator Daniel Clark of New Hampshire during a debate on
the Civil Rights Act in 1866, "that the negro is a man!"' 0 3 This point
was the crux of the issue, "and the senator from Kentucky may prove
that there are.., a hundred and six points of difference between him
and the white man, but until he shows that he is not a man, the negro
will be entitled to be treated as a man, and to demand and enjoy the
same privileges as other men."'1 4 This was the challenge to White
Southerners: to show that Black men were not men; to exclude them
from access to the attributes and privileges of manhood. Bans on in-
terracial marriage were part of this project.
Racial intermarriage had a sporadic life as a political issue be-
tween the 1840s and 1860s, generating contentious debate and result-
ing in the passage of intermarriage bans in several Northern and
Midwestern states. The most thorough and insightful student of this
legislation concludes that these episodes were more closely linked to
partisan jockeying than to the importance of the issue of intermar-
riage itself. 05 But during the 1864 presidential campaign, an elabo-
rate political hoax catapulted racial intermarriage into international
prominence, and etched this issue indelibly on the White Southern
psyche. 10 6
Two journalists at the Democratic New York World concocted an
anonymous pamphlet coining the term miscegenation and advocating
what had previously been termed "racial amalgamation" as the pre-
ferred route toward a higher civilization. The pamphlet was then cir-
culated to leading abolitionists and Republicans in hopes of eliciting
endorsements of its philosophy. When some rose to the bait, their
replies were fed to the rabidly racist Democrat, Ohio Representative
Samuel Sullivan Cox, who used them to berate the Republicans in a
101. 43 CONG. REc. 344 (1873).
102. On the power, honor, and esteem associated with white manhood, see generally Wy-
AfT-BROWN, supra note 12.
103. PoLE, supra note 15, at 207.
104. Id.
105. FOWLER, supra note 96, at 147-220.
106. See Kaplan, supra note 93.
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debate over the establishment of the Bureau of Freedmen's Affairs. 10 7
Claiming that the war was not "between slavery and freedom, but be-
tween black and white," Cox went on to link public accommodations,
social equality and miscegenation in a triad that would become insep-
arable in political debate and would serve as a rallying slogan for the
forces of "white supremacy."'1 08
Miscegenation, or "racial amalgamation," had been inflicted on
slaves by owners before the war; but the absorption of the children of
such relationships into the household was automatic and (at least inci-
dentally) profitable. The children of slave mothers were slaves by law,
no matter who their father was, and White male planters seemed fre-
quently to have little compunction against holding their children as
slaves. 1°9 Under slavery, antimiscegenation laws had been merely one
piece of a complex of laws that made "non-whiteness" a legally de-
fined status virtually equivalent to slavery. After the war, prohibitions
on intermarriage took on a highly charged importance as the legal
system of slavery and the labor control it exerted fell by the
wayside." 0
Before the War, all but four slave states had laws forbidding mar-
riages between Whites and people of African descent."' Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland and Texas penalized interracial fornica-
tion and adultery; only Georgia did not also forbid interracial mar-
107. Id. at 295-97.
108. Id. This triad had its apotheosis in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1896), and
retained its power for members of the Supreme Court well beyond Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. Note, for example, Felix Frankfurter's reluctance to address challenges to antimiscegena-
tion statutes in the wake of Brown. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE
JUDGE 666-71 (1994). In correspondence with Learned Hand about the implications of Brown
for state bans on interracial marriage, Frankfurter argued that the Brown case "did not rest on
the absolute that the XIVth in effect said '[every] state law differentiating between colored and
non-colored is forbidden'... I'm confident that as comprehensive a position as yours in dealing
with miscegenation ... would not have commanded unanimity. I know I would not have agreed
to it-nor, I'm sure would several others." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Sep-
tember 27, 1957), in GUNTHER, supra, at 669 (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., FAUST, supra note 36, at 87; THE SECRET EYE: THE JOURNAL OF ELLA GER-
TRUDE CLANTON THoMAs, 1848-1889, at 168-69 (Virginia Ingraham Burr ed., 1990) (entry for
Jan. 2, 1859) [hereinafter THE SECRET EYE]; MARY CHESNUT's CIVIL WAR 29, 31 (C. Vann
Woodward ed., 1981) (entry for Mar. 8, 1861).
110. See TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 153-54.
111. Arkansas: Ark. Rev. Stat. 536, ch. 94, §§ 4, 7, 9 (1838); Delaware: Del. Rev. Stat. 236,
ch. 74 §§ 1, 2 (1852); Florida: 1832 Fla. Laws chs. 4-5; Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. 384, 386, 387
(1852); Louisiana: La. Digest of Civil Laws 24, Title IV, ch. 2, Art. VIII (1808); Maryland: 1859
Md. Rev. Laws 237, Art. XXX, 1860 Md. Pub. Gen. Laws 236, 240-41; Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 401 (1835); North Carolina: N.C. Rev. Code 80, ch 34, § 80 (1854); Tennessee: Tenn. Rev.
Stat. 384, 386, 387 (1852); Texas: 1857-58 Tex. Laws 164-65; Virginia: Va. Code 471-72, 739-40,
ch. 109, § 1, ch. 196, § 4, 8.
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riage.112 In the last third of the nineteenth century, as virtually all
Northern states (and some Midwestern states) that had banned racial
intermarriage stripped those laws from the books, 113 virtually every
Southern state enacted or re-enacted laws against intermarriage, often
increasing the severity of the punishment. 14 While marriage between
races was forbidden and frequently criminalized, illicit sex and bas-
tardy - which were at least as dangerous to the goal of "racial purity"
as interracial marriage - were only infrequently singled out from
general prohibitions on non-marital sex for special legal sanction. 1 5
Mississippi, one of the few Southern states that had not banned
marriage between the races before the Civil War,116 made up for that
failure by mandating life imprisonment for any "white person" and
"freedman, free negro or mulatto" who intermarried." 7 Interracial
sex, on the other hand, subjected the offending White man to a two
hundred dollar fine and imprisonment of no longer than six months;
the "freedwoman" could be fined fifty dollars and imprisoned for no
more than ten days.118  The difference in punishment is stark-the
message could not be more clear that marriage, or "social equality"
was the target, with maintenance of racial purity coming in a distant
second.119
Like Mississippi's legislators, Georgia's first postwar (White)
lawmakers perceived interracial marriage as an immediate and signifi-
cant threat to White supremacy; they singled out the code section for-
bidding such marriages for inclusion in the fundamental law of the
state, declaring that "the marriage relation between white persons and
112. 1832 Fla. Laws chs. 4-5 (1832); 1851-52 Ga. Acts 262; Ky. Rev. Stat. 384, 386, 387 (1852);
1859 Md. Rev. Laws 237, 242, Art. XXX secs. 121,122, 145,146, 1860 Md. Pub. Gen. Laws 236,
240-41, secs. 127, 128, 151, 152; 1857-58 Tex. Laws 164-65.
113. 1883 Me. Acts 167; 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 16, no. 23, 24; 1887 Ohio Laws 34, § 1; 1881
R.I. Acts & Resolves 108, ch. 846; 1867-68 Wash. Laws 47-48. Illinois' miscegenation law did not
appear in its statutory compilation of 1874. ILL_ REV. STAT. ch. 89 (1874).
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 3602, 3603 (1867) (penalty of two to seven years in the peniten-
tiary or hard labor); 1881 Fla. Laws ch. 3283 (making interracial marriage a felony, subject to 6
months to 10 years in prison); 1865 Miss. Laws ch. 4, § 3 (penalty for interracial marriage life
imprisonment); 1870 Tenn. Laws ch. 39 (changing offense from misdemeanor to felony subject to
one to five years in prison or county jail); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ArN. (1879) (penalty of one to
five years in prison).
115. Alabama and Texas were two of the states that had these legal sanctions.
116. Two states were Alabama and South Carolina; Georgia adopted a ban in 1861.
117. 1865 Miss. Laws ch. 4, § 3; 1865 Miss. Laws ch. 6, § 2.
118. Id.
119. In 1880, Mississippi reduced the penalty from life imprisonment to a $500 fine or up to
10 years in prison, or both. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1147, 2895 (1880). Not only did Mississippi
criminalize interracial marriage, but by 1920 created a new misdemeanor to penalize advocacy of
"social equality or of intermarriage between whites and negroes." 1920 Miss. Laws ch. 214.
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persons of African descent, is forever prohibited."'120 Before the war,
Georgia had directed its legislative attention solely to interracial sex,
addressing interracial marriage only in the Code implemented as the
state left the Union.12 1 And, although an interracial anti-fornication
statute was passed after the war, it was so little noted that the state
supreme court seemed unaware of its existence. 122
During Reconstruction, Black legislators in Mississippi, Louisi-
ana, and Arkansas attempted to criminalize interracial concubinage-
as a protection for Black women-and to legitimize interracial mar-
riage.123 In Arkansas, Black delegate William Grey sought to per-
suade the 1868 constitutional convention to mandate the death
penalty for any White man cohabiting with a Black woman.124 The
Draconian nature of Grey's proposal only partially explains its rejec-
tion; Southern legislatures in the immediate postwar period were
more interested in maintaining racial hierarchy than the racial purity
that would become paramount in the twentieth century. 25 Legislators
gave short shrift to the objection that a prohibition on marriage be-
tween Whites and "persons of African descent" would require "a
board of scientific physicians, or professors of anatomy to discover
who is a negro."' 26 Where legislators were silent on the definition of
120. According to the 1865 Georgia Constitution,
The marriage relation between white persons and persons of African descent, is forever
prohibited, and such marriage shall be null and void; and it shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to enact laws for the punishment of any officer who shall knowingly
issue a license for the celebration of such marriage, and any officer or minister of the
gospel who shall marry such persons together.
GA. CONST. of 1865, art. V, § 1. Alabama and Tennessee also placed their prohibitions in the
constitution. ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 31; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. XI, § 14.
121. 1851-52 Ga. Acts 262 (adultery and fornication); GA. CODE § 1661 (1861) (interracial
marriage).
122. GA. CODE §§ 4245,4487 (1868); 1868 Ga. Laws 17-18; Smith v. DuBose, 78 Ga. 413,433
(1887).
123. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THm BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1750-1925, at
399-402 (1976).
124. Id.
125. To the extent that antimiscegenation measures were intended to assure racial purity,
they probably functioned primarily on a symbolic or ideological level. One study surmised that
"neither the severity of the law nor the intolerance of public sentiment (in American pioneer
society) seemed to have much effect on the miscegenation of the races: they prevented inter-
marriage rather than race mixture. The clandestine intermingling tended to increase." Although
this study estimated an increase in the mixed race population of 500% between 1850 and 1910, it
is likely that most of this increase came from mixing between mulattoes and blacks, rather than
through significantly increased mixing between whites and blacks. EDWARD B. REUTER, THE
AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM: A STUDY OF THE NEGRO 314 (1927). On the racist problems of
Reuter's study, see JOHN D. SMITH, AN OLD CREED FOR THE NEW SOUTH: PRO-SLAVERY IDE-
OLOGY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY, 1865-1918, at 188, 218-19 (1985). See also WILLIAMSON, supra
note 94, at 97-98.
126. GUTMAN, supra note 123, at 400.
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"negro" courts and juries were able to use their own judgement. Ad-
ditionally, where detailed quantification of "blood" was prescribed,
the sense of the community was the effective determinant of what
marriages would be challenged.' 27
The truth of the matter was that race-definition was so imprecise
that even under the slave regime, those with the most at stake in
maintaining the fiction of race, were embarrassed by their inability to
unerringly follow their race precepts. White slaveowner Gertrude
Thomas tells of a "singular little circumstance" under which she was
presented with a visitor whose appearance was "so much that of a
mulatto" that she was uncertain how to behave toward him.128 Since
she did not wish to insult him if he were White, she invited him in.129
When her husband returned, he invited the visitor to dinner.' 30 Ac-
cording to Thomas:
When he took his hat off, he looked more suspicious than ever. Mr.
Thomas . . . then asked him several questions, among them where
they voted around here? His reply was "I am not a voter!"... [T]he
temptation to reply to him "that the same law that did not allow him
to vote did not allow him to sit at a white lady's table" was almost
irresistible . . .131
Georgia's Chief Justice, with unintended poignancy and irony, noted
the multiple levels of embarassment that the ideology of race
presented: "which of us has not narrowly escaped petting one of the
pretty little mulattoes belonging to our neighbors as one of the
family?"1 32
It was argued by some, particularly in the years preceding the
decision in Loving v. Virginia133 in which the Supreme Court declared
antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional, that the arguments in
Congress by Southern members against the Fourteenth Amendment
on the grounds that it might allow miscegenation, represented "polit-
ical smokescreens, which everyone discounted at the time" since no
127. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 952-57 (1993)
(book review discussing the historical issue of race definition).
128. THE SECRET EYE, supra note 109, at 161 (entry for Feb. 11, 1858).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Bryan v. Walton, 33 Ga. Supp. 11, 24 (1864). Mark Tushnet discusses the problems that
Southern judges confronted when they unsuccessfully attempted to transform the law of slavery
into a law of race: the difficulties "seem to have included problems in determining race when it
mattered, miscegenation on a scale large enough to complicate line-drawings, and manumission
with its concomitant creation of an undesired but apparently ineradicable class of free blacks."
TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 140.
133. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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one seriously believed that interracial marriage would ever be al-
lowed. 1' The miscegenation hoax of 1864 suggests the limits of this
assertion. If this were not a serious fear on the part of White
Southerners, there would have been no need to go further than simply
to re-enact pre-war antimiscegenation statutes. The experience of
Georgia, however, suggests otherwise.
In Georgia, the first post-war constitutional convention, con-
vened in 1865 and made up of unreconstructed White secessionists,
essentially preserved the confederate constitution of 1861, with nods
to the North on emancipation and the supremacy of the Federal Con-
stitution.135 As noted above, one of the few significant additions was
the prohibition against interracial marriages and the mandate to the
legislature to pass laws for the punishment of officers performing such
marriages. 136 That Georgia should forbid interracial marriage is no
surprise; Southern states (and Northern) had began such prohibitions
as early as the eighteenth century; some colonies had such prohibi-
tions in the seventeenth century. 137 But it is hard to escape the impor-
tance this prohibition held after the war when, in spite of the re-
enactment of the entire 1861 Code, including the antimiscegenation
provision, the convention singled out antimiscegenation for explicit
reaffirmation in the organic law of the state. 138 States such as South
Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi that had not prohibited interracial
marriage in the antebellum period scrambled to place such bans in
their postwar codes.139 South Carolina extended contract rights to
freed people in 1866, and repealed all discriminatory laws contrary to
134. Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original
Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1227 (1966). Avins' goal was to construct an originalist brief against
striking down antimiscegenation laws in the late 1960s. Avins' conclusion is essentially, although
uncritically reiterated in Byron Curti Martyn, Racism in the United States: A History of An-
timiscegenation Legislation and Litigation 600-01 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Southern California) [hereinafter Martyn, Racism].
135. GA. CONsT. of 1861 and 1865; NUMAN V. B~amREY, THE CREATION OF MODERN GEOR-
GIA 46-47 (2d ed. 1990).
136. See Kaplan, supra note 93. Shortly thereafter, the legislature passed an act mandating
fines of $500 to $1000 and/or six months in jail for officiating at an interracial marriage, and $200
to $500 and/or three months in jail for issuing a license. Georgia Act of Mar. 7, 1866, No. 254, at
241.
137. WILLIAMSON, supra note 94, at 7-14; Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A
Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49, 50 (1964); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. &
Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum
Virginia, 77 GEo. L.J. 1967 (1989).
138. Scott v. State, 30 Ga. 321 (1869); WALTER MCELREATH, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF GEORGIA (1912); GA. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 11 (1868) ("The social status of the
citizen shall never be the subject of legislation"); GA. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 1, 91 XVIII (1877).
139. 1864-65 S.C. Acts § 8, at 291; ALA. CODE §§ 3602, 3603 (1867), at 690; 1865 Miss. Laws
ch. 4, § 3.
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the act, but specifically excepted the 1865 intermarriage
prohibition. 140
C. Social Rights v. Social Equality
White Southerners, both male and female, were preoccupied with
racial intermarriage. Gertrude Thomas, in a long and contradictory
passage in her diary during the summer of 1869, revealed internal con-
flict that she resolved against interracial marriage. 141 Although she
begins by predicting that "these persons never having known the
weight of bondage & having received the equalizing influence of edu-
cation will be received socially into some families," (noting that "al-
ready I see social equality between our uneducated women & our late
servants"), she concludes that
[t]he boys of our country poor as well as rich must be educated,
must have instilled and ever kept before them the idea of social &
mental superiority & this must be no imaginary idea of caste but a
real substantial fact .... We have superiority of race by nature &
education. Let us see that we maintain it and then all laws concern-
ing marrying or giving in marriage will be useless. As it is the law is
almost an insult to Southern women.142
"Social. equality" became virtually synonymous with interracial
marriage in the late nineteenth century, and was used as a slogan
against all manner of rights-access for Blacks in much the same way as
the term "white supremacy." For many Whites, the logic seemed inex-
orable: if Blacks were given the vote; if they were educated in the
same schools as Whites; if they rode on the same streetcars, stayed in
the same hotels, traveled in the same railroad cars or attended the
same theatres, "social equality" - racial intermarriage - could be
expected to result. Like its counterpart, "white supremacy," "social
equality" was trotted out in all manner of debate over public policy.
A delegate to the Georgia constitutional convention of 1877 argued
that failure to provide a sufficient level of debt protection in the form
of a homestead exemption for Whites would "sooner or later lead" to
that "social incubus:" "the amalgamation of races."'1 43
140. See 1866 S.C. Acts at 394. South Carolina subsequently abrogated the proscription in
the 1868 constitution; within two years after the Compromise of 1877 and the end of Reconstruc-
tion, the ban was back in place. S.C. CONST. of 1868 art I, § 39 (1868); 1879 S.C. Acts at 3.
141. THE SECRET EYE, supra note 109, at 320-22 (entry for June 26, 1869).
142. Id.
143. P.H. Edge, Argument for a Liberal Homestead in the Constitution of Georgia, in A
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION HELD IN
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 447, 450 (1877).
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In his 1912 treatise on Georgia's constitutional law, Walter
McElreath summarized the thinking behind, and the importance of,
legal prohibitions on interracial marriage following emancipation:
The most important of all the provisions of the [1865] constitution
framed at that dark and critical period was that great police regula-
tion laid in the State's organic law at the very foundation of her
social life simultaneously with the recognition of the negro as a free-
man that: 'The marriage relation between white persons and per-
sons of African descent is forever prohibited, and such marriage
shall be null and void.' Thus, while superior power forced the negro
into the ranks of the freeman, and, presently, admitted him into the
full domain of political rights, the white people of Georgia, as the
inheritors of the common law, asserted that their homes, though ru-
ined by war, were their castles and that into them even the king
could not enter, and upon their thresholds, they erected a barrier
behind which legitimate home life should be sheltered from African
admixture. 144
What, legally, could such a prohibition accomplish? The lan-
guage of "barrier" is set in the context of men barricading their castles
against an encroaching sovereign, but the issue in question touches on
the social relations between individuals.145 Georgia's Chief Justice Jo-
seph Brown evoked the same blurred public private prohibition when
he determined that no law could compel social equality in public ac-
commodations such as trains, boats, or hotels, and that "[t]he same
remarks apply to the regulation of social status among families, and to
the social intercourse of society generally."'1 46
Miscegenation laws were by their very nature state regulation of
families, as was all marriage law. But this language of sovereignty and
familial autonomy against state (read Federal) interference is heard
over and over in the context of sexual relationships between Whites
and Blacks. The language is curious and demands careful examina-
tion to determine how various Southerners - White and Black, male
and female - understood the meaning of the regulation.
144. MCELREATH, supra note 138, at 145.
145. The imagery of family protection is one of the most perplexing to understand and ex-
plain. Time and again restrictions on rights generally and on racial intermarriage specifically
were justified as protecting white families from "racial admixture," as if whites would be forced
against their will to marry blacks. One way to understand the meaning of this argument is to
read "family" very broadly as a symbol of or analogy to white society in the South; thus individ-
ual whites who chose to marry blacks would be forcing "racial amalgamation" on the unwilling
"white family" of the entire South.
146. Scott v. State, 30 Ga. 321, 325 (1869). Scott was decided before Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations and before the Act
was struck down by the Supreme Court.
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IV. "THE 'BUGBEAR' AT WHICH AMERICAN JUSTICE IS
FRIGHTENED"
Senator Charles Sumner confronted the amalgam of social rela-
tions and civil rights time and again as he brought what was to become
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to the Senate floor from 1870 until his
death in 1873. Thus, in an exchange between Sumner and Senator
Hill of Georgia, Senator Hill affirmed that Sumner's
definition of rights differs materially from my own. What he may
term a right may be the right of any man that pleases to come into
my parlor and be my guest. ... The Senator may contend that it is
the right of any man, under the institutions of this nation, to inter-
marry with any caste that he pleases.147
To Sumner, this was a familiar approach, "confounding what be-
longs to society with what belongs to rights."'1 48 To African Ameri-
cans as well, the claim was transparent and frustrating. Douglas
Griffing of Oberlin, Ohio, expressed that frustration in a letter to
Charles Sumner:
We do not wish to force ourselves into American Society un-
welcomed. Social equality seems to be the bugbear at which Ameri-
can justice is frightened, and the colored man denied many public
privileges accorded to other American citizens. What we ask now,
is simply equal public privileges, and that the social question be al-
lowed to regulate itself without the interference of the law of any
States.... We desire social rights.149
The specter of federally mandated "amalgamation" was brought
to bear time and again in the Congress as an argument against equal
treatment in public accommodations. In 1873, during debate in the
House over the Civil Rights Act, another Southerner, Kentucky Dem-
ocrat James B. Beck argued:
I suppose there are gentlemen on this floor who would arrest, im-
prison, and fine a young woman in any State of the South if she
were to refuse to marry a negro man on account of color, race or
previous condition of servitude, in the event of his making her a
proposal of marriage, and her refusing on that ground. That would
be depriving him of a right he had under the amendment, and Con-
gress would be asked to take it up, and say, "This insolent white
woman must be taught to know that it is a misdemeanor to deny a
man marriage because of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude;" and Congress will be urged to say after a while that that sort
147. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, 242 (Dec. 20, 1871).
148. i
149. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 431 (Jan. 17, 1872) (letter from Douglas C. Griffing
to Senator Charles Sumner on Dec. 13, 1871) (emphasis added).
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of thing must be put a stop to, and your conventions of colored men
will come here asking you to enforce that right.' 50
From a modem perspective, formed in the aftermath of the Civil
Rights Cases and the creation of the state action doctrine, the con-
verse of antimiscegenation laws would have been no regulation, or the
extension of freedom of contract to all without regard to race, rather
than the suggestion by McElreath and Chief Justice Brown that the
alternative was state mandated intermarriage, or at least, enforcement
of marriage contracts against Whites coerced into marrying Blacks
under the aegis of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Still, the state action doctrine laid down in 1883 was not a fore-
gone conclusion prior to its announcement by Justice Bradley.'5 '
Contemporaries in and out of Congress viewed the Reconstruction
amendments and the Civil Rights Acts as potentially potent checks on
private as well as public behavior. The New York Times, commenting
on an "affair or honor" arising between a White candidate for the
Virginia Legislature and "a chivalrous colored person," reported as
follows:
Mr. Flanagan, having knocked the colored man down for differing
with him in political opinion, was challenged to fight a duel by the
aggrieved man.... Mr. Flanagan not only refused to fight but ap-
pealed to the law for protection. Of course, Mr. Flanagan bases his
refusal to give the colored man the satisfaction of a gentleman on
the ground that the code is silent in regard to colored challenges,
and that hence a challenge sent by a colored man can be ig-
nored.... If the colored challenger of Mr. Flanagan is arrested, he
should at once bring proceedings against Mr. Flanagan under the
Civil Rights bill. Mr. Flanagan, in discriminating against his chal-
lenger on the ground of color, has clearly violated the principles of
the Civil Rights bill, and should be prosecuted to the extent of the
law.152
Although the Times and Congressman Beck may well have had
tongue-in-cheek in suggesting legal penalties for private foibles, they
150. CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (Dec. 19, 1873) (Beck's remarks are an inter-
esting commentary on the meaning of marriage generally and on what the legitimate bases might
be for refusing a marriage offer).
151. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S 3 (1883). Hyman and Wiecek indicate that by 1876 the
Supreme Court was well on its way down "a state-action-only path of interpretation," but their
discussion of Justice Bradley's circuit court position in United States v. Cruikshank, and Justice
Hunt's dissent in United States v. Reese indicates that the door was not yet closed to an expansive
interpretation of federal powers under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments or the 1870
Force Act. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 487-92. Certainly, what the justices of the
Supreme Court understood to be the limits of federal power in the aftermath of the Compromise
of 1877 was less than self-evidently true to Republicans, particularly the Radicals.
152. MAJOR BEN C. TRUMAN, DUELLING IN AMERICA 30 (Steven Randolph Wood ed.,
1992).
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nevertheless reveal an important point about popular nineteenth-cen-
tury impressions of the Fourteenth Amendment, both North and
South. State action, as a necessary precursor to federal action, did not
have so firm a grip upon public perceptions as it came to have for the
Supreme Court; certainly it did not immediately preclude an under-
standing of Fourteenth Amendment scope that encompassed prohibi-
tions on private acts. 153 This clearly was true of Radical Republicans,
but it was not so far outside the realm of the possible for many others
as to make the idea too farfetched for satire. 154
A. "Lern to spell and pronownce Missenegenegenashun.
Its a good word.... "
The ban on interracial marriages may initially have been in part
the act of defiance against the conquering North that McElreath sug-
gested, but certainly more was at stake than flouting Northern
precepts, which were frequently as virulently opposed to racial inter-
marriage as those of the South. 155 Southern antimiscegenation laws
trumpeted the message that White families should close ranks to ex-
clude and thus socially subordinate inferior Blacks. The Little Rock
Gazette, outraged at the 1868 Arkansas convention's failure constitu-
tionally to prohibit interracial marriage (it chose instead the compro-
mise measure of condemning "all amalgamation"), invoked a slogan
that was to reverberate through the first two-thirds of the twentieth
century. The danger to White men of the new constitution, declared
the Gazette, was that it sent a signal to Black men "to marry their
[White men's] daughters and, if necessary, hug their wives." 156
When the discussion shifted from the threat of Black men mar-
rying White women to the problem of White men marrying Black wo-
men, the tone of the debate changed markedly. To opponents of such
bans, the tack was to suggest that proponents felt that only an affirma-
153. This may have been because the public continued to link federal action to the Thir-
teenth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment for longer than the courts did.
154. Of course, Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases argued the position of
the Act's supporters; but he referred primarily to acts of individuals that were by their nature
public. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26, 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
155. For Northern attitudes, see FOWLER, supra note 96; Applebaum, supra note 137 (listing
the states that repealed and the states that passed the bans). Congressional debates over the
implications of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 for the marriage
contract and the status of married women suggest that Northern congressmen would for the
most part agree that marriage was more status than contract. As for Northern racial relations,
segregation of other sorts was more prevalent in both the North and South in the years immedi-
ately surrounding the Civil War. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THm STRANGE CAREER
OF JIM CROW (2nd rev. ed. 1966).
156. GtrrMANt, supra note 123, at 401.
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tive law against such intermarriage could adequately protect White
men against the menace of their own proclivities. 5 7 Republican
members of Congress recognized and exploited the humorous aspects
of this argument, but without apparent effect. Petroleum Vesuvius
Nasby, the satirical creation of David Ross Locke, and at the time
"Paster at the Church uv the Noo Dispensashun" advised "Alluz
preech agin the nigger" in his counsel to a Democratic student of the
ministry:
It's soothin to a ginooine, constooshnel Southern-rites Dimekrat to
be constantly told that ther is a race uv men meaner than he is....
Preech agin amalgamashen at leest 4 Sundays per munth. A man uv
straw that yoo set up yerself is the eesiest nockt down, pertikelerly if
you set him up with a view uv nockin uv him down.... Lern to speli
and pronownce Missenegenegenashun. It's a good word .... 158
Years later, in a wry comment on the Southern White male
psyche, suffragist and anti-lynching reformer Jessie Daniel Ames
mused "I have always been curious about the ...white mentality
which as far back as I remember assumes that only segregation and
the law against intermarriage keep ... white women from preferring
the arms of Negro men."'1 59 Gertrude Thomas had made much the
same observation in the 1860s. The law had done its job - for Ames,
as for Thomas - intermarriage was unthinkable and thus neither
legal nor extra-legal means of discouraging racial mixing seemed
necessary.
B. Scott v. State and "The Social Status of Citizens"
In Georgia, the legal meaning of the state's ban on racial inter-
marriage was not worked out until 1869, one year after the 1865 con-
stitution was abrogated in the first phase of Reconstruction. The
Republican document that replaced the 1865 constitution and brought
Georgia temporarily back into the Union the first time in 1868 de-
creed that "[t]he social status of the citizen shall never be the subject
of legislation.' 160 While this might seem a straightforward prohibi-
157. Debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act reveal sarcastic
charges such as this by Northern congressmen against Southern congressmen.
158. D.R. LOCKE, THE MORAL HISTORY OF AMERICA'S LnE STRUGGLE 15 (1874), quoted in
Kaplan, supra note 93, at 307.
159. JACQUELINE D. HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMES AND THE
WOMEN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 154 (1979).
160. GA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1868). What the convention had in mind in approving this
clause is unclear, in part because although the convention was clearly dominated by Republi-
cans, the Georgia party was thoroughly factionalized. Although the Radicals succeeded in their
main economic program-passage of relief and homestead exemption proposals-"the presence
of fifty-nine Moderate Republicans and forty-six Democratic delegates ensured that on most
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tion, the 1868 convention also reinstated the Georgia code containing
the provision prohibiting and nullifying interracial marriage. 161
Two Supreme Court Justices, Joseph Brown and Henry McCay,
gave their views on the matter in Scott v. State in 1869.162 Charlotte
Scott, a Black woman, was brought before Judge Clark of the Dough-
erty Superior Court in December of 1868 under indictment for "co-
habiting and having sexual intercourse" with a White man named
Leopold Daniels. 163 Judge Clark refused to hear Charlotte Scott, her
daughter Missouri, or Leopold Daniels testify that Scott and Daniels
had been married in Macon three months before the indictment.164
He also refused to act on counsel's suggestion that he marry the two
(in fornication cases, subsequent marriage was a defense), saying that
they might get someone else to perform the ceremony, if they could
find anyone who would. 165 The court charged the jury that even if
Scott had married Daniels, the marriage was null and void. 166 The
jury found Scott guilty.167 On appeal to the state supreme court,
Scott's attorney argued, among other things, that the code section
prohibiting interracial marriage was in conflict with the 1868 constitu-
tional clause, declaring that "[t]he social status of the citizen shall
never be the subject of legislation."' 68
Chief Justice Joseph Brown, who had been Georgia's secession
and Confederate governor, and subsequent pragmatic supporter of
the 1868 Republican constitution, delivered the court's opinion in
Scott v. State. To Brown, the marriage relation was certainly one of
social status, but the code's ban on interracial marriage had defined
that aspect of the status before the ratification of the 1868 constitu-
tion.169 Therefore, he interpreted the constitutional ban to mean that
measures the Georgia convention would adopt a conservative stand." ELIZABETH S. NATHANS,
LOSING THE PEACE: GEORGIA REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1871, at 58-62
(1968); see also EDMUND L. DRAGO, BLACK POLIrICANS & RECONSTRUCTION IN GEORGIA: A
SPLENDID FAILURE 41 (1992).
161. GA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1868).
162. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869).
163. Id. at 322. The indictment itself specified the charge as adultery and fornication; the
Supreme Court silently changed the wording to make the charge consistent. See Indictment,
Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) (Ga. Supreme Ct. Case File No. A-4372) (located at the Georgia
Department of Archives and History) [hereinafter Indictment]. There is no evidence that Scott's
husband, a white man, was similarly prosecuted.
164. Scott, 39 Ga. at 322.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 324.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 324 (citing to GA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1868)).
169. Id.
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the legislature could never repeal the antimiscegenation statute.170 In
the manuscript version of Brown's opinion, which became the head-
note to the published version, Brown concluded with the highly con-
tradictory statement that "as the social relations of citizens are not the
proper subjects of legislation the Constitution has wisely put the mat-
ter at rest by denying to the legislature the power to repeal or enact
laws on that subject.' 171 Invoking the religious imagery of social hier-
archy that had been the mainstay of the antebellum pro-slavery argu-
ment, Brown decried the notion of social equality that interracial
marriage represented:
Such equality does not in fact exist, and never can. The God of
nature made it otherwise, and no human law can produce it, and no
human tribunal can enforce it. There are gradations and classes
throughout the universe. From the tallest arch angel in Heaven,
down to the meanest reptile on earth, moral and social inequalities
exits, and must continue to exist through all eternity.' 72
Brown relied on regulations of social status in existence at the
time the 1868 Constitution was ratified to support his reading of the
Constitutional ban on status legislation. In Brown's reading, the Con-
stitution left "social rights" and status where it found them, and pro-
hibited any future legislation that might change the "social" relations
that pertained in 1868.173 Given the political complexion of the 1868
convention, it may well be that Brown's interpretation of the status
ban was what the convention had in mind.174 But, it would have been
more in line with Brown's own statement of the impropriety of legisla-
tion on the subject to suppose that the Constitutional provision re-
pealed the legislative provision.
Once he had determined that the Constitution, Republican or
not, solidified social status as it existed in 1861, Chief Justice Brown
set about classifying marriage as a relationship beyond the ken of civil
rights. Foreshadowing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and the Southern
position on the subject of equal access to public accommodations,
Brown referred to the common law right in Georgia of churches to
segregate their congregations as well as the practice of railroad and
steamboat companies, and of hotel keepers, to classify their guests
and passengers according to race or sex, and to assign them accommo-
170. Id. at 321.
171. Manuscript Opinion of Chief Justice Brown, Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) (No. A-
4372).
172. Scott, 39 Ga. at 326.
173. Id. at 324.
174. See supra note 157.
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dations on that basis.175 "There was no law," Brown accurately stated,
"to compel them to group together in social connection, persons who
did not recognize each other as social equals."'1 76 And in this absence,
the 1868 Constitution acquiesced and mandated that there should be
no such law in the future.177 The conquering North could not require
anything more than equality of civil rights. "The fortunes of war have
compelled us to yield to the freedmen the legal rights above men-
tioned," Brown acknowledged, "but we have neither authorized nor
legalized the marriage relation between the races, nor have we en-
acted laws or placed it in the power of the Legislature hereafter to
make laws, regulating the social status, so as to compel our people to
meet the colored race on terms of social equality."'1 78
Judge McCay, 179 in a concurring opinion, disagreed with Brown's
assertion that marriage was a relationship of status; he based his con-
currence on the belief that marriage was purely contractual and thus
not only within the purview of legislative regulation, but also in no
sense in conflict with Georgia's constitutional prohibition against tam-
pering with the citizen's social status. McCay professed agreement
with Brown on the intent of the status-legislation ban, but read
around the status prohibition simply by denying that marriage was
anything but a civil contract. This, of course, carried its own difficul-
ties, as Brown's opinion suggests: if marriage was only a civil contract
and no more, federal law might be brought to bear, implicating the
provision on new equal protection grounds under the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. If marriage was a civil contract,
then, as the Civil Rights Act debates suggest, it could not be circum-
scribed without calling into question the legitimacy of the discrimina-
tion as a denial of equal protection. But, as with the Congress,
categorizing rights helped justify limits that could not otherwise be
supported if rights were associated with citizenship as an undifferenti-
ated whole. As had been the case before the war, dividing rights into
175. See Scott v. State, 39 Ga. at 326. Efforts to insure equal access to public accommoda-
tions failed throughout the South during the Presidential Reconstruction; by 1873, however,
equal access laws had been passed throughout much of the South. FONER, supra note 35, at 369-
72. Never adequately enforced, these laws would be gone by the 1890s. Id. at 593.
176. Scott, 39 Ga. at 325.
177. In 1870, Georgia passed a law requiring common carriers to provide "like and equal
accommodations" for all passengers; apparently this did not qualify as legislation relating to the
"social status" of the citizen. 1870 GA. Acrs 398, 427-28.
178. Scott, 39 Ga. at 326.
179. For biographical background of Henry Kent McCay, see 3 WILLAM J. NORTHEN, MEN
OF MARK IN GEORGIA 432-34 (1911); I.W. AVERY, THm HISTORY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
FROM 1850 TO 1881, at 375-76, 440 (1881).
[Vol. 70:873
ONLY THE LAW WOULD RULE BETWEEN US
groups and placing them within a hierarchical structure allowed for an
allocation of limited and perhaps dependent rights without extending
to freed people the whole panoply of civil, political and social rights
associated with White male citizenship.
This legerdemain with the content of rights was no arid legal de-
bate: how the Reconstruction Acts and Amendments would be inter-
preted was of intense moment, and the subject of heated disagreement
for all who perceived a stake in the outcome. What the extent of fed-
eral power might be under the Fourteenth Amendment was totally
uncharted territory, of significant concern to many Southerners, White
and Black. "Government has full power to regulate civil and political
rights," announced Brown, "and to give each citizen of the state...
equal protection of the laws."'i This, according to Brown, the con-
quering North could require, but "social" and "moral" equality it
could not.181 By removing marriage from the realm of civil or political
rights, and placing it within the category of purely social status-and
thus in the forbidden territory of social equality-Brown sought to
forestall the possibility of federal interference, declaring "government
has no power to regulate social status.' 8 2 Shortly thereafter, the first
federal judge to hear the issue, Judge John Erskine of the Northern
and Southern District of Georgia, while acknowledging the mixed
contract/status aspects of marriage, found that marriage "has hitherto
been regulated and controlled by each state within its own territorial
limits" and thus in the absence of a violation of equal protection,
outside the jurisdiction of federal courts. 183 In an opinion that com-
pletely obliterated the humanity of the parties, Erskine determined
that a ban on interracial marriage could have no implications of any
import to the provision of equal civil rights. 84 In a statement that
would later be echoed and achieve prominence in the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Pace v. Alabama, 85 Erskine denied that
the marriage ban constituted a denial of equal protection, since the
burden fell equally on both races.' 86
Georgia's assertion that the marriage relation was a mixed status/
contract relationship echoed a national trend away from a pure con-
180. Scott, 39 Ga. at 326.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262, 264 (D.Ga. 1871) (No. 6,550).
184. Id. at 264.
185. 423 U.S. 1061 (1976). Erskine's interpretation reiterated what had frequently been said
in Congressional debates on the issue. See, e.g., Avins, supra note 134, at 1224-55.
186. See Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. at 262.
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tract model of marriage. At the same time Elizabeth Cady Stanton
was arguing for divorce reform on the grounds that marriage should
be purely contractual on a commercial mode, other women were like-
wise suggesting that family needed to look more like contract. 187
Judges throughout the South reverted to status language to keep mar-
riage out of the realm of contract, where the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would bring it under federal
supervison. Judge McCay's analysis of marriage as a purely contrac-
tual relationship was unusual, prompted by the opacity of the "social
status" clause of the Georgia Constitution. Judge McCay notwith-
standing, the effect of the antimiscegenation reasoning of Georgia's
judges was to reinforce a status notion of the marriage relation, in
order to assert a cultural control over one of the most intimate areas
of people's lives, the decision to marry. In Georgia, this was being
done in the name of race and White supremacy.
C. Antimiscegenation, Lynching, and Gender:
Defining Manhood as White
The link between Whiteness, citizenship and manhood was not
one initially forged in the tensions of Reconstruction. Even before
Justice Taney's denial of manhood and citizenship to free Black men
in 1857,188 Judge Henry Lumpkin had made the same point in a case
concerning the effects of manumission in 1853:
the status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free, is such
that he has no civil, social or political rights or capacity, whatever,
except such as are bestowed on him by Statute... the act of manu-
mission confers no other right but that of freedom from dominion of
the master, and the limited liberty of locomotion; that it does not
and cannot confer citizenship, nor any of the powers, civil or polit-
ical, incident to citizenship .... 189
Citizenship and its civil, political, and social rights were not, and
could never be, acquired by a man of African descent, precisely be-
cause he was not White, but also because, not being White, he could
not be a man:
The argument is, that a negro is a man; and that when not held to
involuntary service, that he is free; consequently that he is a free
man; and if a freeman in the common acceptation of the term, then
187. For the "growing retreat from a full contractual definition of matrimony," see GROSS-
BERG, supra note 9, at 137. For Elizabeth Cady Stanton's contrasting contract model of mar-
riage, see Elizabeth B. Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century
America, 8 L. & HisT. REv. 25, 26 (1990).
188. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
189. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198 (1853).
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a freeman in every acceptation of it.... The fallacy of it is, its as-
sumption that the manumisson of the negro, which signifies nothing
but exemption from involuntary service, implies necessarily, and im-
parts ipso facto, all the rights, privileges and immunities which are
incident to freedom, among the free white inhabitants of this
country.190
Therefore, to be a man, one had to be White; part of the clear
definition of manhood was Whiteness. By Lumpkin's lights, "to enjoy
the offices, trusts and privileges our institutions confer on the White
man, is not now, never has been, and never will be, the condition of
this degraded race."'191 Lumpkin further stated that
To my mind, the idea is absurd, that the mere act of manumission
can invest with all the attributes of manhood in a free state, a being
who had no head or name or title, in the State before; who was held,
pro nullis, pro mortuis, and for some, yea many purposes, pro
quadrupedibus.192
In 1874, during debate over Sumner's civil rights bill recently in-
troduced in the House, Tennessee Democrat John D. Atkins made
reference to an antimiscegenation provision that he supposed was in
Pennsylvania's new constitution, noting that "Pennsylvania wisely de-
clines to allow her manhood to be emasculated by the degeneracy
which always marks a mongrel race."'1 93 In a similar understanding of
the linkage between manhood, Whiteness, and marriage, a Tennessee
state convention of African Americans passed a resolution that same
year in favor of pressing the case of David Galloway to the United
States Supreme Court, a resolution that was read into the Congres-
sional Record in both the House and Senate by opponents of the Civil
Rights Act.194 Galloway, a Black man, had been prosecuted and im-
prisoned for having married a White woman. 195 The Tennessee con-
vention declared that Galloway, although exercising his right of
American citizenship, "had been deprived of his liberty and divested
of his manhood and the enjoyment of his personal rights."'196 Ten
years later, "Africanus" in the Cleveland Gazette railed against this
perception in reaction to Fredrick Douglass's marriage to a White wo-
man, writing that "[a]ny attempt on his part to set forth that we can
190. Id. at 203.
191. Id. at 202.
192. Id. at 204.
193. 2 CONG. REC., 453 (1874).
194. 2 CONG. REc., 4143 (1874) (Resolution of the colored State convention, Nashville,
Tenn., April 29, 1874); see also Martyn dissertation, supra note 134, at 599.
195. Martyn, Racism, supra note 134, at 599.
196. Id.; see also Avins, supra note 134.
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only remove the obstacles in our way to manhood is to bleach out the
race, is unfair to the negro."' 97
By the end of the century, racial purity arguments supported
spreading antimiscegenation laws in the wake of Social Darwinism
and the eugenics movement. 198 While Northern states were repealing
their antimiscegenation laws, some western states passed antimis-
cegenation laws in the last third of the century, particularly focussing
on peculiarly Western immigrant concerns: the Japanese and the Chi-
nese.' 99 But as David Donald has noted, Social Darwinism does little
to explain Southern racial attitudes in the 1890s, much less in the
1870s and 1880s. Southern Whites did not need to turn to science to
support their belief in racial superiority; biblical citations did quite
well enough.2°° In the South, ownership of one's body did not prove
to be the solution to domination that Stanton argued for in the
North.20 ' The cultural context for antimiscegenation in Georgia sug-
gests that the law was used to define proper family relations for White
men who attempted to marry Black women, while lynching drew the
line at any intimate relationship between Black men and White wo-
men long before marriage could even be contemplated.202 Black wo-
men would continue to be subjected to unprotected sexual violation
by White men - frequently their employers - while being denied the
possibility of legitimate union with White men.20 3 White women
could not have any relationship at all with Black men on pain of op-
probrium for themselves in the White world, and potentially death for
their men.2°4
197. FOWLER, supra note 96, at 245 (quoting a letter from "Africanus" which appeared in the
Cleveland Gazette in February, 1884).
198. On the relationship between the eugenics movement and regulation of interracial mar-
riage, see Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 421 (1988); on racial purity, see Walter Wadlington, The
Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189
(1966). By 1927, 29 states had antimiscegenation laws of one sort or another; all of these were
either western or southern states with the exception of two midwestern states: Indiana and Ne-
braska. Of the nineteen states without antimiscegenation laws in 1927, all were northern or
midwestern states except Arizona, New Mexico, and Washington (Washington had repealed its
antimiscegenation statute in 1867, and New Mexico had done the same in 1886). See Miscellany,
13 VA. L. REG. 311 (1927).
199. See FOWLER, supra note 96, at 267-68.
200. David H. Donald, A Generation of Defeat, in FROM THE OLD SouTH TO THE NEW:
ESSAYS ON THE TRANSITIONAL SouTH 3-4 (Walter J. Fraser, Jr. & Winfred B. Moore, Jr. eds.,
1981).
201. Clark, supra note 187, at 30. This was also true in many other contexts, especially labor.
202. HALL, supra note 159, at 203-05.
203. GuTMAN, supra note 123, at 385-400.
204. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK,
AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 149-50 (1986).
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As Ida B. Wells Barnett exposed in her indictment of "the old
thread-bare lie that Negro men assault White women," miscegenation
laws were aimed at forestalling "the legitimate union of the races,"
noting that there were "many white women in the South who would
marry colored men if such an act would not place them at once be-
yond the pale of society and within the clutches of the law."' 20 5 With
antimiscegenation law in Georgia directed primarily toward marriage,
White men could continue their quasi-legal prerogative of sexual
domination of Black women while still maintaining control over Black
male/White female non-marital relationships through the threat of
lynch law. Thus, it was under lynch law that rape came to mean "any
mesalliance existing between a White woman and a colored man. '206
What is critical here is not that the majority of lynchings were proba-
bly economically rather than sexually motivated, but that lynching as a
symbol of the ultimate control - that of life or death - that the
White world could exercise over the Black, was justified as a primal
and protective response to Black rape of White women. Neither
Black men nor White women could escape the implicit message: rela-
tionships between White women and Black men could be fatal to
Black men.207
The threat of rape embodied in the imagery of lynching, and the
reinforcement of social and economic boundaries that lynching repre-
sented "were intimately connected, for the fear of rape, like the threat
of lynching, served to keep a subordinated group in a state of anxiety
and fear. ' 208 Jacqueline Dowd Hall concludes that "[i]t may be no
accident that the vision of the Negro as threatening beast flourished
during the first organizational phase of the women's rights movement
in the South. '20 9 Genital mutilation and castration accompanied
many lynchings. Henry Lowther, for instance, became too active in
the Republican party for Klu Klux comfort; he was visited with the
choice between castration and death.210 In another case, a body was
strung up and burned after its death placed the owner beyond the
reach of any message, either punitive or deterrant. 211 Clearly the act
205. HAZEL V. CARBY, RECONSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD: THE EMERGENCE OF THE AFRO-
AMERICAN WOMAN NOVELIST 109-11 (1987).
206. Id. at 113.
207. Id.
208. HALL, supra note 159, at 153.
209. Id.
210. Aremona Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Se-
curity and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation, 1865-1910,
70 CHI.-KErT L. REV. 439 (1994).
211. See also JONES, supra note 204, at 149-50.
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was meant to achieve other ends. Mutilation and the defiling of bod-
ies testify to the level of hatred and animosity that Blacks as "the
other" aroused in the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction White
South. Killing was not sufficient to satisfy the virulence and pathology
of the antipathy Southern Whites felt towards those no longer legally
within their complete control.212
D. David Dickson's Will
To a certain extent what set Southern antimiscegenation law
apart from that of the Midwest, and to a lesser extent, the law of the
West, was how White Southerners chose to characterize the prohibi-
tion within the boundaries of their culture in the decades following
emancipation. What was spoken of elsewhere primarily in scientific
terms of maintaining racial purity was spoken of in Georgia in the
more intimate terms of family integrity and patriarchal control. Cer-
tainly the two could be mixed: Justice Brown spoke of the degenera-
tive effects of racial intermarriage in his opinion in the Scott case.213
But the overwhelming rhetorical concern seemed to be in maintaining
"legitimate" social distance and in reestablishing "white supremacy"
through cordoning off White families rather than simply White indi-
viduals. Jacqueline Jones has shown that "black domestics and their
employers daily lived out the paradoxical southern system of public
segregation and private integration. '21 4 For all their professed fears
of "social" contact in public accommodations, Whites were clearly fo-
cussed on a particular type of contact, that is, contact on the plane of
equality. For Whites, but particularly White men, Black men mar-
rying White women represented an assumption of equality in access to
manhood, and that was simply too much to bear.
As eugenics concerns penetrated popular thought in the twenti-
eth century, purity arguments began to take on greater importance in
the South.215 The difference between the later and earlier periods lay
in the nature of the threat to the structure of Southern society as per-
ceived by shifting coalitions of White lawmakers. The immediate
postwar concern was in defining family through marriage laws; later
212. Id.
213. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869).
214. JoNEs, supra note 204, at 150.
215. See generally Lombardo, supra note 198; Wadlington, supra note 198.
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the precise details of status definition and barricading the color line
became paramount.216
The importance of family to Georgia's antimiscegenation scheme
comes into focus from a look through the lens of the notorious case
Smith v. DuBose,217 the case of David Dickson's wil. 218 Unlike Scott,
which concerned interracial marriage and a criminal indictment, Smith
focussed on concubinage, illegitimacy, and property rights, and explic-
itly implicated Georgia's public policy with regard to those issues.
The judges, obliged to decide the case on appeal, thought it important
enough to engage in highly irregular behavior, even for nineteenth-
century Georgia.
David Dickson was one of the wealthiest men in Georgia at the
time of his death in 1885, and perhaps one of the more eccentric as
well.219 Certainly his White family and neighbors thought as much.
As a forty-year old bachelor, Dickson, a planter and agriculturist who
made his fortune (twice) in cotton, seed, and fertilizers, had impreg-
nated one of his slaves, thirteen year old Julia. Julia and Dickson had
one child, Amanda America Dickson. Not only did Dickson give
Amanda a good education, but, according to David's brother Green,
he treated Julia better than he did his mother.220
Dickson lost his first fortune in the war, but began building up a
new one almost immediately after the war through his seed and ferti-
lizer business. By his death in 1885, he had an estate valued at
upwards of $500,000.221 In his will, David Dickson left the bulk of his
estate to his daughter for life, with the remainder to go to her children
when she died. At the time Dickson drew up the will, Amanda had
two sons, born in 1866 and 1870, whose father was Dickson's best
friend, Charles Eubanks. Dickson's White relatives, who began
216. For a characteristic statement of twentieth-century obsessions with racial purity and
maintaining the color line, see generally The New Virginia Law to Preserve Racial Integrity in
XVI VIRGINIA HEALTH BULLETIN (1924).
217. 78 Ga. 413 (1887).
218. For the notoriousness of the Dickson will case, see REBECCA L. FELTON, CoUTrR
LIFE IN GEORGIA IN THE DAYS OF My YOUTH 93 (1919); NATHANIEL HARRIS, AUTOBIOGRA-
PIY 487-93 (1925).
219. The following account relies on: Supreme Court Case Files, Smith v. Dubose, 78 Ga.
413 (1887) (No. A-14443) (located at Georgia Department of Archives and History) [hereinafter
Smith, Supreme Court Case File]; Kent A. Leslie, Woman of Color, Daughter of Privilege:
Amanda America Dickson, 1849-1893 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory Univer-
sity); Jonathan Bryant, Race, Class, and Law in Bourbon Georgia The Case of David Dickson's
Will, 71 GA. HIST. Q. 226 (1987); ADELE ALEXANDER, AMmoUOUS LIVES: FREE WOMEN OF
COLOR IN RURAL GEORGIA, 1789-1879, at 185-89 (1991).
220. Smith v. Dubose, 78 Ga. at 419.
221. Bryant, supra note 219, at 226-27.
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emerging from the woodwork when he died, were left a total of
$30,000. They immediately took steps to challenge the will.222
The various relatives, represented in the case name by Dickson's
White nephew J. Dickson Smith, challenged the will on three basic
fronts, the third of which is of most concern here.223 This third chal-
lenge was based on the theory that the will was void because it was
contrary to the public policy of Georgia, garnered from the prohibi-
tion on racial intermarriage. 224
Smith and the other White relatives claimed that the will "in its
scheme nature and tendencies, is illegal and immoral and in its spirit
aims and purposes is contrary to public policy subversive of the inter-
est and well-being of society and in violation of the constitution and
laws of this state. '225 On its face, the import of this claim simply sug-
gests that leaving property to an illegitimate child and her illegitimate
children supports immorality, but a rejected jury charge clarifies ex-
actly what the would-be heirs were claiming. They requested the trial
judge to charge the jury that: "Under the constitution and laws of the
State of Georgia, marriages between White persons and negroes are
forbidden, and the public policy of the State is against the mingling of
the blood of these races, and if you believe this will is against said
policy, it is absolutely void. ' 226 The lower court judge, Samuel
Lumpkin, refused to make this charge, and for this, along with twenty-
seven other enumerated errors, the White relatives appealed to the
state supreme court.227
One of the attorneys for the disinherited relatives, Nathaniel
Harris, left an unusually frank and detailed account of the behind-the-
scenes machinations of the Smith court.228 The case was a notorious
one, and the three justices of the supreme court were clearly reluctant
to decide it. According to Harris, the two associate justices, Samuel
Hall and Mark Blandford, took him aside during the noon recess on
the first day of arguments to discuss the progress of the case and its
222. Id. at 234.
223. Two concerned fraud and undue influence-that Amanda and/or her mother Julia had
exercised undue influence over Dickson to procure the will; and that they had fraudulently
conspired to make Dickson believe that Amanda was his daughter when in fact she was not and
that her children were Charles Eubanks' when in fact they were not. Smith v. Dubose, 78 Ga. at
427-28.
224. Id. at 427-28, 433.
225. Smith, Supreme Court Case File, supra note 219.
226. Smith v. Dubose, 78 Ga. at 430.
227. Id. at 417-26.
228. HARRIS, supra note 218, at 487-93.
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political impact. 229 "This, of course, was entirely out of the ordinary,"
admitted Harris in a respectful understatement, "but as the case in-
volved questions of State and National policy, the judges were willing
to talk to me to ascertain what view was entertained outside the
courthouse. '230
Harris did his best to explain public sentiment about the will, but
was apparently unable to sway the judges, who told him he had better
settle the case. A disgruntled Harris replied that he could not possibly
settle the case now, after the judges' morning questions had left the
opposing lawyers absolutely confident of the outcome. "I'll help you
out," volunteered Judge Blandford, "[1]et me ask a few questions of
the counsel who speaks for the defendants in error this afternoon and
he won't be so confident at the end of my questions."' 231 True to his
word, Blandford sought to shake the confidence of Harris's oppo-
nents, but to no avail. Colonels DuBose and Reese, perceiving their
possession of both the law and the court, refused to give an inch.232
Supremely discouraged, Harris conveyed to his co-counsel, Colo-
nel Rutherford, the inclination of the court to uphold the lower
court's ruling: "[S]tartled, hurt, and almost overwhelmed," Col. Ruth-
erford gathered himself the next day to deliver "a speech such as has
never been heard in any courthouse in Georgia, or in the South. '233
His impassioned oration in defense of "the future of the Anglo-Saxon,
the traditions of the past, the hopes of the future ... finally over-
whelmed the court. '' 234 Judge Hall acknowledged that he had not un-
derstood the case before, and Chief Justice Jackson "put his head
down upon the docket before him and wept like a child. '235 Lest the
reader be unconvinced of the depths of emotion stirred by Colonel
Rutherford in relating the evils of David Dickson's will, Harris adds
that the Chief Justice pounded the bench with a "resounding crash,"
exclaiming "I would rather die in my place than uphold this will." 236
Only Judge Blandford remained unmoved.237
Unfortunately for the Chief Justice, he proved true to his word.
Within a few days after arguments in the Dickson case he was stricken
229. Id. at 488.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 489.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 490-91.
234. Id. at 491.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 492.
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with pneumonia and died.238 And, despite Judge Hall's impulsive re-
quest for Colonel Rutherford's argument, that he might put it in the
opinion as "a warning and an appeal to the people of this generation,"
Judge Blandford prevailed, the Supreme Court affirmed, and the will
was upheld.239
Like Judge Lumpkin in the case below, Judge Hall turned away
Colonel Rutherford's appeal to public policy. "What is public policy"
he asked, "[a]nd where must we look to find it? And in ascertaining
and applying it to the transactions of life, by what rules and precau-
tions are the courts to be guided?" 240 His objection rested on two
judicial tenets: first, that judges should be most concerned with the
concrete interests of the individuals immediately before them, rather
than the interests of an abstract public embodied in the state; and sec-
ond, that in refusing to instruct the jury that they might decide on
what the public policy of Georgia might be in relation to David Dick-
son's will, the trial judge quite properly recognized that such a ques-
tion was not one of fact for the jury, but one of law for the judge.241
These points, however, have the air of ex post facto rationalization
about them, as the court certainly implied that appeals to public policy
would have had more force to change the outcome had David and
Julia been "married."24 2
Before it rejected resorts to public policy as bases for decision
making in all but the most limited instances, the court declared that
"It is unquestionably true that a testator, by his will, may make any
disposition of his property, not inconsistent with the laws or contrary
to the policy of the State. '243 As the court noted, the objection to the
validity of the will was based on the constitutional and statutory prohi-
bition against intermarriage between the races, as tending to implicate
a policy against interracial intercourse. But, said Hall, "Illicit inter-
course between persons of the same as well as different races is made
penal by our code" and "whatever rights and privileges belong to a
White concubine, or to a bastard White woman and her children,
238. Id. Jackson died in January of 1887. BRAsWELL D. DEEN, JR. & WILLIAM S. HEN-
WOOD, GEORGIA'S APPELLATE JUDICIARY 39 (1987).
239. See Harris, supra note 218, at 492-93. The reluctance of this court to decide this case
may have been well-founded in concerns beyond law and policy. If we are to take Harris's word,
it proved to be an unusually fatal case, killing not only the Chief Justice only days after the
argument, but Judge Hall as well, shortly after the decision was read. DEEN & HENWOOD, supra
note 238, at 49; Judge Blandford managed to survive the case, living until 1902. Id. at 51.
240. Smith v. Dubose, 78 Ga. at 435.
241. Id. at 435-40.
242. Id. at 431.
243. Id. at 434.
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under the laws of Georgia, belong also to a colored woman and her
children." 244 The constitutional prohibition, in other words, was di-
rected toward racial intermarriage, not interracial intercourse, which
could be adequately controlled under the general proscription against
fornication and adultery. Dickson's will made no suggestion that he
wished to dispose of his property in response to an assumption of mar-
riage with Julia or legitimacy of his biracial daughter Amanda, as
"there was no pretense of marriage between Eubanks and Amanda"
and no assumption by Dickson of the legitimacy of his biracial grand-
sons. Consequently, no policy questions were implicated beyond a
policy against meretricious intercourse, which the court took some
pains to indicate could not be brought to bear because the will could
not be encouraging such intercourse in either Julia or Amanda's case,
since both Dickson and Eubanks were dead.245
The Smith court's equal protection grounds for upholding the
will, coming as it did after the Fourteenth Amendment had been evis-
cerated by the United States Supreme Court, has a strange ring to it,
and requires explanation. One reading has it that this case was part of
a general post-Reconstruction strengthening of absolute property
rights in order to bolster planters' authority over their workers. 246
Under this reading, Smith falls within a whole grouping of economic
legislation and cases which sought, through for example, crop lien
laws, stock laws, and hunting and fishing regulations, to control labor
and bring Blacks, (and of Constitutional necessity poor Whites as
well), under a new class-based plantation system.247 Certainly, prop-
erty rules were being used to do just that, and Smith can be read as
part of a reworking of labor control into a legally class-based rather
than race-based system in response to the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But such a reading seems too narrowly economic in
light of the strong antimiscegenation sentiments in the South at the
time. Dickson was not flouting racial policy in his will; he had co-
habited with a Black woman and fathered a bastard child, both activi-
ties which Georgia had a long tradition of viewing with an indulgent
eye and a wink. All he had done was provide for his child and
grandchildren after his death, with no pretense that his relationship or
that of his daughter ought be legitimated by such an act. Indeed,
244. Id. at 433-34.
245. Id. at 431, 435, 441.
246. Bryant, supra note 219, at 237-40.
247. Steven Hahn, TiH Room OF SOUTmER POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE GEORGIA UPcoUNTRY, 1850-1890, at 242-44 (1983).
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Dickson's well-known life and writings precluded any assumption that
his relationship with Julia constituted an attack on Southern social hi-
erarchy. 24 The short work done with the Fourteenth Amendment in
Scott and Hobbs suggests what would have happened had there been
an issue of marriage: the court could simply have said that allowing
Amanda Dickson to inherit from her White father undermined a posi-
tive statement of law abrogating interracial marriage, and the same
result would have been obtained had it been a Black man claiming
marriage to a White woman. The law fell equally on both races.
Finally, it is important to note that Amanda Dickson was born of
a union between a master and a slave, and that in her case, there could
have been no question of a threat to post-war racial purity. Her sons
were another question: assuming that David Dickson was "all white"
and Julia was "all black," Amanda was "half-white" and her sons were
"three quarters white." Both were born after the war, and thus posed
a threat to a new notion of White purity. But as I have suggested, the
real issue was not racial purity in the abstract, but family purity in the
service of White supremacy. Just as the positive-good argument had
relied on a racial justification for slavery, and thus a rigid and defensi-
ble definition of race, so in slavery's aftermath a similar argument of
economic and social stratification relied on a rigid race definition.
Georgia law did not define fornicators and their illegitimate children
as families. Thus, as Nathaniel Harris tells us, Judge Hall narrowly
interpreted the scope of Georgia's family policy and allowed a White
man to leave his property to his "illegitimate negro offspring, even to
the exclusion of his childless widow and his White nephews and
nieces." 249
It is difficult to escape the familial content of White Georgia's
strictures against miscegenation. Although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forced the arguments in support of Georgia's prohibition on in-
terracial marriage into certain channels, one should not discount the
courts' dismissive attitude toward interracial fornication as compared
to interracial marriage. Judge Hall's answer to the suggestion that the
248. LuMPKIN, supra note 45, at 63-64. Friends, acquaintances and employees of David
Dickson indicated that while he built Julia a house that was in some respects nicer than his own,
he did not flaunt his relationship with her by having her stay in his house; likewise, he was
discreet enough so that business associates and friends could bring their wives and daughters to
his house and testify that they were unaware of the relationship between the two or that Dickson
had a biracial child and grandchildren. Id.
249. HARRIS, supra note 218, at 493. Harris's biases overcame him here: David Dickson had
no widow. He did marry in the early 1870s, but his wife died after two years, predeceasing him
by thirteen years. Georgia law did not allow complete disinheritance of a wife. Id.
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antimiscegenation provision was in the nature of a state policy against
interracial intercourse is telling: Georgia had no need for such a pol-
icy, because the law prohibited all illicit intercourse.2 SO Intercourse
was not the issue addressed by the miscegenation law, according to
Hall, that problem was dealt with elsewhere, and was not (in Georgia)
in itself racist.25'
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
Marriage fixed legal statuses. It regulated property ownership,
transmission, and control; legitimated children; contained sexuality;
and determined legal power relationships by gender and age. Under
slavery, legal marriage had been impossible for the unfree both under
the property theory of slavery and within the logic of the moral econ-
omy of dependency. With the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and later with
the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to marry and acquire the status
relationships that marriage conferred was extended to those who had
been slaves. One of those statuses was head of household, and its
legal implication of manhood. The question was, how far would Black
men be allowed to take that status without challenge?
W. E. B. Du Bois suggested that "[t]o the ordinary American or
Englishman the race question at bottom is simply a matter of owner-
ship of women; White men want the right to use all women, colored
and White, and they resent the intrusion of colored men in this do-
main. '' 252 Jessie Daniel Ames likewise would claim that "lynching is a
result of causes which are deeply buried in our political and economic
system which find nourishment in our doctrine of white supremacy,
which in its nature is tied in to a sex warfare between white and Negro
men." 253 Whatever its label or manifestation, friction over every as-
pect of "social relations" between the races was endemic in the post-
war South. The White South adopted myriad strategies for maintain-
ing dependency on a new footing after the destruction of legal slavery.
These strategies ranged from the virtual re-creation of slavery under
the Black Codes that preceded Congressional Reconstruction, to the
Jim Crow laws that followed the abandonment of Reconstruction.
250. See id.
251. Smith v. Dubose, 78 Ga. at 433. ("The principal complaint here is that anything which
has a tendency to induce intercourse between persons of the white and negro races, is contrary
to public policy, and consequently void; and this conclusion is drawn from the prohibition of
marriage between the races...").
252. PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 61 (1984).
253. HALL, supra note 159, at 248.
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They included terrorism and social degradation. Moreover, it is clear
that the prohibitions on racial intermarriage were indeed intended to
be, among other things, "badges and incidents of slavery."
Bans on the right to marry "across the color line" became more
stringent in the twentieth century as the quest for "racial purity" over-
came and displaced debates over social rights and social equality
which had receded with the accomplishment of Constitutionally sanc-
tioned Jim Crow laws. The intensity of White antipathy to the idea of
interracial marriage, when seen in the context of the reality of interra-
cial sex and procreation, requires more explanation than has yet been
given. The desire for "racial purity" is clear, but as explanation, it
does no more than rephrase the question. And, again, maintenance of
"white supremacy" leads us no further than its statement. Antimis-
cegenation rules may have affected only a tiny minority in terms of
directly checking individual action, and the same could be said about
lynching. But the rules not only determined the limits of action, they
served to reinforce the White definition of manhood, and helped to
legitimize limitations on "social rights."
In determining the meaning and nature of freedom, the judges
and lawmakers of the Reconstruction era and beyond used the tactic
of categorizing and ordering rights as a means to reinforce the racial-
ization of dependency. This worked in part because the familializa-
tion of slavery in the proslavery rhetoric of the antebellum period fed
into the power of the miscegenation "bugbear" that was promoted
and exploited in the political struggles during the war and after. Gen-
der figured significantly in the identification of social rights (generally
public accomodations) with "social equality" as a code for racial inter-
marriage; this association justified severely limiting the ambit of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the same time, the
complex linkages of manhood, citizenship, and Whiteness played back
into the moral economy of dependency that White Southerners sought
to maintain in the face of legal rights claims. The mark of their suc-
cess was the distance yet to cover before "only the law would rule
between us."
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